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PATENT INVALIDITY VERSUS
NONINFRINGEMENT
Roger Allan Ford†
Most patent scholars agree that the Patent and Trademark Office
grants too many invalid patents and that these patents impose a significant
tax upon industry and technological innovation.  Although policymakers
and scholars have proposed various ways to address this problem, including
better ex ante review by patent examiners and various forms of ex post ad-
ministrative review, the use of district courts to invalidate patents remains a
core defense against bad patents.
This Article analyzes a previously unidentified impediment to the use of
district courts to invalidate patents.  Nearly every patent lawsuit rises or falls
on one of two defenses: invalidity or noninfringement.  Invalidity and non-
infringement are distinct legal and factual issues that scholars usually ana-
lyze separately.  Yet as this Article explains, the two issues are closely related,
creating a series of trade-offs and asymmetries that lead many patent defend-
ants to focus on noninfringement instead of invalidity.  The net effect of
these trade-offs and asymmetries is that patent defendants often have an in-
centive to argue noninfringement instead of invalidity, leading courts to in-
validate fewer patents than they should.  This exacerbates the problem of
invalid patents, making it harder for individuals and companies to create
new products and services.
The Article concludes by proposing three reforms to help restore the bal-
ance between invalidity and noninfringement.  First, eliminating the ele-
vated burden of proof for invalidity would remove one significant asymmetry
that makes it harder to prevail on invalidity.  Second, a bifurcation rule
giving defendants the option to defer infringement issues until after validity
has been decided would help litigants develop coherent trial narratives, al-
lowing them to focus on validity issues early in a case, while delaying some
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settlements until after courts have ruled on invalidity challenges.  And third,
a new cause of action for an accounting, brought against industry competi-
tors by a litigant that successfully invalidates a patent, would help eliminate
the collective-action problem posed by invalidity’s public-good nature.
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INTRODUCTION
Archers hate vibrations.  An archer releasing a bowstring and fir-
ing an arrow unleashes a great deal of force in a short time, much of
which sends the arrow toward the target.  Some of the force, however,
is transferred to the bow, causing it to vibrate and throwing off the
accuracy of the shot.  To address this problem, inventors have created
numerous damping systems to absorb and dissipate these vibrations.
One such system was created by Steven C. Sims, who received for his
invention a patent, the ’842 patent, titled “Archery Bow Accessories
with Bow Vibration Decay Pattern Modifiers for Improving Accu-
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racy.”1  The patent describes a “mushroom-like” attachment that
screws into each end of the bow, made out of a soft polymer that can
“wiggle and jiggle” when the bow is fired, absorbing and dissipating
the vibrations.2
Armed with this patent, Sims and his company, Sims Vibration
Laboratory, Inc., targeted Bow Jax Inc., asserting that its products in-
fringed the ’842 patent and two others.3  Bow Jax makes damping sys-
tems similar to the one described in the ’842 patent, including one
that attaches to each end of a bow and dissipates vibrations by wig-
gling.  The Bow Jax system is not identical to the one described in the
’842 patent, though—instead of the mushroom shape described and
claimed in the ’842 patent, Bow Jax’s dampers have an X shape with
four arms that vibrate when an arrow is fired.4
Faced with the threat of patent litigation, Bow Jax, like most ac-
cused infringers, had two major defenses on which it could have re-
lied: invalidity and noninfringement.5  An invalidity defense asserts
that the patent holder did not satisfy the basic requirements to obtain
a patent, usually because the claimed invention was not novel or
1 U.S. Patent No. 6,298,842 (filed Jan. 6, 2000) (issued Oct. 9, 2001).
2 Id. at col. 1 ll. 35, 46.
3 See Plaintiff Bow Jax’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 10, Bow Jax, Inc. v. Sims Vibra-
tion Lab., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-047-RMP (E.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2010), ECF No. 88; Defendants’
Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaims ¶ 10, Bow Jax, Inc. v. Sims Vibra-
tion Lab., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-047-RMP (E.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2010), ECF No. 92.
4 See Limb Dampeners, BOWJAX, INC., http://www.bowjax.com/products/limb-dampen
ers/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).  (You may notice that in the course of two paragraphs and
two footnotes I have used three versions of the company’s name.  The company’s legal
name, according to its filings with the Idaho Secretary of State, is “Bow Jax Inc.”  Court
filings in the patent litigation use “Bow Jax, Inc.”—the legal name, plus a comma—while
the company’s website says “Bowjax, Inc.”  I use the legal name unless context dictates
otherwise.)
5 It is incomplete to call noninfringement a “defense.”  Although
“[n]oninfringement” and “absence of liability for infringement” are specifically listed in
the Patent Act as “defenses” to a claim for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011), they are not affirmative defenses in the traditional sense because
the defendant asserting the defense does not take on the burdens of production or persua-
sion.  Noninfringement is just the inverse of infringement, which the plaintiff must prove
to recover. See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (explaining that the plaintiff’s burden to prove infringement never shifts to the
defendant, as “the risk of decisional uncertainty stays on the proponent of the proposi-
tion”); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2247582 (“Generally speaking, a defendant in a patent infringement suit can escape liabil-
ity by successfully asserting a coverage-related [i.e., noninfringement] or a validity-based
defense.”).  In practice, however, defendants in patent cases nevertheless make strategic
decisions between the “defenses” of invalidity and noninfringement. See infra Parts II.A,
II.C.  In this argument I refer to invalidity and noninfringement as defenses because in
most cases it is the defendant that decides which issues will be contested and because both
invalidity and noninfringement are ways by which a defendant can avoid liability.
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would have been obvious when it was invented.6  A noninfringement
defense, on the other hand, asserts that the defendant’s accused prod-
uct or method does not fall within the scope of the invention claimed
in the patent.7  Both defenses were plausible for Bow Jax: damping
systems have been used by archers for decades,8 and Bow Jax’s damp-
ing devices are significantly different from those described in the Sims
patents.  So, with two potentially winning arguments, Bow Jax did
what many accused patent infringers do: it chose to rely on nonin-
fringement.  It filed a declaratory-judgment claim against Sims and his
company, seeking a declaration that its products did not infringe the
’842 patent.9
This is all too common a story in patent law: a patent is granted
on an invention that is not really new, the patent holder goes after a
potential infringer, and the accused infringer relies on noninfringe-
ment arguments instead of invalidity arguments.10  This is trouble-
some because invalid patents are arguably the single biggest problem
in modern patent law.11  It is not unusual for a new technology prod-
uct to be covered, or arguably covered, by thousands of distinct pat-
ents owned by hundreds of different patent holders, many likely to be
invalid.  It is impossible to analyze all these patents, so potential in-
fringers often ignore them until they are sued and then settle,
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (listing defenses to patent infringe-
ment based on invalidity); see also id. § 102 (stating the conditions for patentability). See
generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998) (finding, in an empirical study, that most invalidity
findings were based on problems of novelty or obviousness).
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (listing noninfringement as a defense to patent infringe-
ment); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (defining patent infringement); 35
U.S.C. § 281 (2006) (providing for remedy for patent infringement); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Ath-
letic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“To show infringement of
a patent, a patentee must supply sufficient evidence to prove that the accused product or
process contains, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, every limitation of
the properly construed claim.”).
8 See infra note 15. R
9 See Plaintiff Bow Jax’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 3. R
10 There are other defenses, such as the unenforceability of a patent due to inequita-
ble conduct during its prosecution, see Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649
F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc), but noninfringement and invalidity play by far
the largest roles in patent practice, see, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 6 (limiting study R
on patent-litigation outcomes to validity decisions); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How
Are Patent Cases Resolved?  An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent
Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 271–78 (2006); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 5 R
(manuscript at 13).
11 Recent book-length treatments include JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PAT-
ENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008);
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT
(2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BRO-
KEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2004).
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whether or not the patents are valid.12  This imposes a substantial tax
on innovation, raising its cost and reducing the output of new prod-
ucts and services.13
The Bow Jax story had a happy ending for those worried about
invalid patents: though the lawsuit between Sims and Bow Jax was set-
tled,14 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) also initiated a
reexamination of the ’842 patent and eventually rejected the relevant
claims as obvious.15  But administrative processes to invalidate patents
can only do so much; courts also play a significant role in invalidating
bad patents.  And if defendants avoid arguing invalidity, courts will
invalidate fewer bad patents than is optimal.
Ideally, defendants would analyze invalidity and noninfringement
separately, relying on each defense if and when it is strong enough to
be worth arguing.  District courts would then be able to invalidate bad
patents, creating benefits for innovators and consumers.  And the le-
gal literature typically treats them this way, analyzing the two defenses
separately.16  Yet invalidity and noninfringement are interrelated, with
trade-offs and asymmetries that have a substantial effect on parties’
strategic behavior and on the structure of patent doctrine more
broadly.
This Article provides the first detailed examination of the interac-
tion between invalidity and noninfringement.  It argues that these
12 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 20.
13 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (identifying “an unin-
tended and paradoxical consequence of biomedical privatization: [that a] proliferation of
intellectual property rights upstream may be stifling life-saving innovations further down-
stream in the course of research and product development”); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND
THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (discussing problems caused by the
combination of overlapping patent rights and the holdup risk caused by the patent
system).
14 See Stipulated Consent Order and Dismissal at 1–2, Bow Jax, Inc. v. Sims Vibration
Lab., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-047-RMP (E.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2012), ECF No. 272.
15 See Ex parte Sims Vibration Lab., Inc., No. 2013-001458, 2013 Pat. App. LEXIS 784
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2013).  The reexamination was requested by Bow Jax, see Request for
Reexamination, U.S. Patent No. 6,298,842 C1, Control No. 90/009,930 (filed Aug. 5,
2011), suggesting that it saw the PTO as a better venue than the district court for its invalid-
ity arguments, see infra note 169.  The examiner found the invention obvious in view of two R
broad categories of prior art: different kinds of damping systems that were attached to
archery bows, see, e.g., Archery Stabilizer, U.S. Patent No. 4,936,283 (filed Mar. 17, 1989);
Archery Bow with Resiliently Mounted Stabilizers, U.S. Patent No. 3,412,725 (filed Mar. 29,
1965), and similar damping systems used in other contexts, including other kinds of sport-
ing goods, see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,362,046 (filed May 17, 1993) (baseball and softball
bats, golf clubs, and tennis rackets); U.S. Patent No. 5,314,180 (filed Dec. 16, 1992) (rack-
ets); U.S. Patent No. 3,941,380 (filed July 12, 1973) (tennis rackets and baseball bats).
16 See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 5 (manuscript at 2) (“[Under] the ap- R
proach taken by most intellectual property scholars[,] . . . each defense is analyzed on a
standalone basis.”).
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trade-offs and asymmetries result in too few patents being found inva-
lid because defendants are often better off pursuing noninfringement
defenses, while society is often better off if they pursue invalidity de-
fenses.  It then concludes with a proposal for reforms that would help
create balance between invalidity and noninfringement.
After a brief background in Part I, Part II discusses the trade-offs
and asymmetries between invalidity and noninfringement.  Although
in many cases only one of the two defenses will have plausible merit,
in a surprising number of cases both defenses are plausible, at least at
the beginning of the case.  In these cases, trade-offs lead most defend-
ants to focus their efforts on just one of the defenses, and asymmetries
bias that choice in favor of noninfringement.  Trade-offs between in-
validity and noninfringement include the strategic choice between
broad and narrow claim constructions, the need for a single, coherent
narrative for trial, and limited litigation resources.  Asymmetries be-
tween invalidity and noninfringement include the elevated burden of
proof that applies to invalidity defenses, information and timing ad-
vantages that make it comparatively easier for a defendant to argue
noninfringement, and the difference in outcomes between a success-
ful noninfringement judgment and a successful invalidity judgment.
Part III proposes reforms.  First, these tradeoffs and asymmetries
provide another reason to eliminate the elevated burden of proof for
invalidity defenses.  Second, giving defendants the option to bifurcate
cases and defer consideration of infringement issues until after valid-
ity is determined would eliminate the conflict between trial narratives,
would give litigants enough time to focus on the invalidity case, and
would eliminate the need in many cases to ever litigate infringement.
And third, a new cause of action would allow a successful patent chal-
lenger to collect, from competitors who benefit from the judgment, a
portion of those benefits.  This cause of action, akin to an action for
an accounting, would better align the incentives of a patent defendant
with the public interest in its defense.
I
PATENT LITIGATION AND INVALID PATENTS
This Part provides background, discussing the roles of invalidity
and noninfringement defenses in patent litigation and the problem of
invalid patents.
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A. Patent Defenses
A patent grants to an inventor the exclusive rights, for a limited
time, to make, use, sell, offer to sell, and import his or her invention.17
A patent represents a bargain between an inventor and society: in re-
turn for inventing something new and disclosing it to the world, the
inventor gets the reward of a temporary monopoly over that inven-
tion.18  An inventor can only obtain that monopoly, however, if he or
she fulfills the patent bargain: the invention must be novel and non-
obvious, and it must be fully described, enabled, and claimed in the
patent document so that others can make and use the invention once
the patent has expired.
A patent holder who believes that someone else is making, using,
selling, offering for sale, or importing a product or process that incor-
17 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries”).  I should note that this Article is primarily concerned with utility patents, though
many of the arguments could also extend to plant patents and design patents. See 35
U.S.C. § 161 (2006) (plant patents); 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006) (design patents).
18 This is the traditional economic account for patent law: that it provides ex ante
incentives both to create inventions and to disclose those inventions to the world.  The
classic statement of this traditional account is Fritz Machlup’s 1958 Senate report. STAFF OF
S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared
by Fritz Machlup) (evaluating economic justifications for the patent system); see also Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empower-
ing Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) (“The stan-
dard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of
research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technologi-
cal progress.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1580 (2003) (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the purpose of the pat-
ent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.”).
On the disclosure justification for patents, see Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 539, 541 (2009) (“[P]atent disclosure indirectly stimulates future innovation by
revealing the invention’s design so that others can use it fruitfully when the patent term
expires and design around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention, even during
the patent term.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 556 (2012) (“Disclosure theory focuses on the quid pro quo of the
patent system: the inventor receives the exclusive patent right in exchange for fully disclos-
ing the invention to society . . . .”).
The principal alternative view is provided by prospect theory, which asserts an ex post
justification for patents: that by granting a monopoly over a new technology after the tech-
nology has been invented, patents encourage investment in developing and commercializ-
ing the new invention while avoiding wasteful duplication of effort. See John F. Duffy,
Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 (2004); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1977); see
also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129 (2004) (critiquing ex post justifications for patents).
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porates his or her invention can sue for patent infringement.19  The
defendant accused of patent infringement then has two principal de-
fenses, invalidity and noninfringement, which correspond to the two
sides of the patent bargain.  An invalidity defense focuses on what the
inventor contributed to obtain the patent—whether he or she in-
vented something novel and nonobvious and disclosed it to the world
in compliance with the patent laws.  A noninfringement defense, on
the other hand, focuses on the monopoly the inventor gets in ex-
change for that invention and disclosure—whether the defendant’s
product or process falls within that monopoly.
1. Invalidity
An invalidity defense asserts that even though the PTO granted a
patent, that patent is invalid because the inventor failed to comply
with the basic requirements for patentability.20  The focus of any inva-
lidity decision, then, is on the state of the world when the patent was
granted rather than the details of the defendant’s accused product or
process.  There are several invalidity doctrines, but they can be placed
into three broad categories: doctrines that ensure an inventor has cre-
ated something meaningfully new, doctrines that ensure an invention
is fully disclosed to the public, and doctrines that govern the types of
inventions to which the law extends patent rights.21
First, doctrines that ensure an inventor has created something
meaningfully new include the novelty and nonobviousness require-
ments, which are the core doctrines at issue in most invalidity chal-
lenges.22  Their purpose is to help ensure that an inventor has
meaningfully contributed to society before he or she is rewarded with
a monopoly.23  Novelty doctrine generally requires that the claimed
19 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006); see also Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172
F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining legal standards for evaluating patent disputes).
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (invalidity defenses).
21 This taxonomy borrows from the one given in Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in
Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735 (2012).  Sawicki breaks patentability doctrines into
four categories: scope, covering patentable subject matter and utility; the invention itself,
covering novelty and nonobviousness; disclosure, covering enablement and best mode;
and the definiteness doctrine. Id. at 742–44.  I include the written-description require-
ment and group it with the disclosure and indefiniteness doctrines, all of which concern
different aspects of the patentee’s disclosure to the world.
22 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 6, at 208 (finding that 138 out of a sample of 191 R
patents found invalid in patent litigation were invalidated on the basis of 35 U.S.C. § 102
[novelty] or § 103 [obviousness]).
23 The requirement that an inventor contribute something new to society has been a
fixture since the early days of patent law. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*407 n.30 (“The grant of a patent . . . is in the nature of a purchase for the public, to whom
the patentee is bound to communicate a free participation in the benefit of his invention,
at the expiration of the time limited.”); 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS § 221 (1890) (“The consideration for the grant of [an inventor’s] ex-
clusive privilege is the benefit which he confers upon the public . . . .”).  Indeed, the
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invention not have been known, used, or described by others before
the patent applicant came up with the claimed invention.24  Nonobvi-
ousness doctrine adds to this by requiring that an invention not have
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art as of the time
of invention.25  These doctrines help ensure that the patent bargain is
a good one for society: because society generally gains little or nothing
from the independent invention of technologies that already exist, or
that are obvious even if they have not been assembled in the precise
form contemplated by the inventor, no reward is necessary to en-
courage their creation.26  Moreover, such monopolies would be
counterproductive to the prospect nature of patent rights since inde-
pendent inventors, each with his or her own patent rights, would lead
to just the sort of wasteful duplication of effort in developing and
commercializing an invention that the patent system seeks to avoid.
Second, doctrines that ensure that an invention is fully disclosed
to the public include the written-description, enablement, best-mode,
requirement may be constitutional: the Intellectual Property Clause of Article III autho-
rizes Congress to extend exclusive rights only to “Authors and Inventors,” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8, in contrast with the British practice of granting patents to individuals favored
by the Crown, inventors or not. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966)
(noting that the Intellectual Property Clause “was written against the backdrop of the prac-
tices . . . of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses
which had long before been enjoyed by the public”). But see Tun-Jen Chiang, First-to-File as
a Rule of Evidence, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 11 (2012) (arguing that even if the Constitu-
tion limits patents to inventors, a rule granting a patent to the first filer is a constitutional
rule of evidence).
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 2011) (novelty requirements).  This description neces-
sarily simplifies a complex set of statutory rules; the statutory limits of novelty are both
broader and narrower than this description implies.  For example, the United States has
traditionally used a first-to-invent rule, awarding patent rights to the first inventor to create
an invention even if he or she filed a patent application later than another inventor.  This
rule was not absolute, however: under the rule, various kinds of prior art counted or did
not count to show earlier invention, depending on what kind of prior art they were, what
country they were from, when they were from, and so forth. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006),
amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284,
285–87 (2011).  Under the America Invents Act, which applies to patent applications filed
since March 16, 2013, the United States has switched to a first-to-file rule, under which the
first inventor to file a patent application will be entitled to a patent unless the invention
was previously patented, described, or used in public, with various exceptions. See
§ 3(b)(1), (n), 125 Stat. at 293.
25 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (amended 2011); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007) (discussing the legal test for obviousness); Graham, 383 U.S.
at 17–19 (1966) (same).  The America Invents Act also included changes to section 103,
requiring that a claimed invention not have been obvious at the time of its effective filing
date (rather than the time of invention). See § 3(c), 125 Stat. at 287.  This change, how-
ever, does not change the essential purpose of the obviousness requirement.
26 The current rule is not the only possible balance; patent law could drive a harder
bargain. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patenta-
bility, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1599 (2011) (proposing that the nonobviousness requirement be
construed to limit patents to “those inventions which would not [ever] be disclosed or
devised but for the inducement of a patent” (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 11) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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and definiteness requirements.  These doctrines all require clear dis-
closures of specific aspects of the claimed invention, though for some-
what different purposes.  The written-description and definiteness
requirements are relevant during the term of the patent: they require
the disclosure of information that helps readers know the boundaries
of the patentee’s exclusive rights so that they can more easily predict
whether their activities would infringe the patent.27  The enablement
and best-mode requirements, on the other hand, are directed to con-
duct after a patent has expired: they help ensure that others can make
use of the invention after the limited patent monopoly has ended and
that others can improve and build upon the invention without “undue
experimentation.”28  They do so by requiring that a patent provide
enough information to enable someone who is skilled in the art of the
invention to make and use the invention while also disclosing the
“best mode” contemplated by the inventor for practicing the inven-
tion.29  Together, these disclosure doctrines help ensure that the pat-
entee has fulfilled his side of the patent bargain by making available
whatever new thing he or she has invented, in a form that allows
others to make use of the knowledge.
Third, doctrines that govern the types of inventions to
which the law extends patent rights include the utility and
patentable-subject-matter requirements.30  These doctrines prevent an
27 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (laying out the written-descrip-
tion and definiteness requirements); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (observing that one purpose of the written-description
requirement is “to inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the
monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufac-
tured without a license and which may not” (quoting Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Athletic Alts., Inc.
v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (observing that the primary pur-
pose of the definiteness requirement is “to guard against unreasonable advantages to the
patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their [respective]
rights” (alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304
U.S. 364, 369 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of
the Written Description Requirement, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.
org/2010/03/09/risch.html. To this list of doctrines, one could add the basic requirement
that a patentee write claims setting forth his or her invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)–(f).
28 Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
29 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); see also Warner–Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 418
F.3d 1326, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir 2005) (describing the enablement requirement); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963–64 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing the best-mode
requirement); Nat’l Recovery Techs., 166 F.3d at 1195–96 (describing the enablement re-
quirement).  The America Invents Act eliminated failure to satisfy the best-mode require-
ment as a ground for invalidating a patent, though the requirement continues to exist
when prosecuting a patent application. See § 15, 125 Stat. at 328 (amending 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (2006)).
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (limiting patents to “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
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inventor from obtaining a patent on an invention that is overly con-
ceptual or abstract, because it would preempt too much subsequent
innovation.31  Thus, under the patentable-subject-matter doctrine, an
inventor may not patent “laws of nature, physical phenomena, [or]
abstract ideas.”32  Likewise, under the usefulness doctrine, an inventor
may not patent an invention for which no practical use is yet known so
that it can only be used for further research.33  These doctrines also
have a secondary purpose of reinforcing the requirement that an in-
ventor create something new since laws of nature, physical phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas are more likely than other inventions to have
been discovered, created, or used before.
2. Noninfringement
A noninfringement defense argues that even if a patent is valid, it
does not cover what the accused infringer makes or does.34  This is an
argument that the accused product or process does not fall within the
monopoly granted to the inventor as the other half of the patent bar-
gain.  The scope of the patent monopoly is determined by the patent’s
claims, which must “particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ]
the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as
the invention.”35  Under the modern law of patent infringement, the
claims define the scope of the invention and thus the limits of the
inventor’s monopoly rights.36  This was not always so: until 1836, pat-
thereof”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225–29 (2010) (evaluating the scope of 35
U.S.C. § 101); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–10 (1980) (same).
31 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563, 568
(2012) (noting that patent law seeks to exclude overly conceptual or abstract ideas in order
to avoid preempting subsequent ideas but arguing that preemption concerns may be
overhyped).
32 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
33 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (“Unless and until a process is
refined and developed to this point—where specific benefit exists in currently available
form—there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may
prove to be a broad field.”).
34 See 35 § 282(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (noninfringement defense); Seal-Flex,
Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing the
elements of infringement).
35 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
36 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“It is a
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which
the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari
Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); see also Merrill v. Yeo-
mans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (observing that claims are “of primary importance” in deter-
mining “precisely what it is that is patented”).
There is extensive recent literature debating whether claims really do, or should, set
forth the scope of a patentee’s rights and whether courts do, or should, construe claims
atextually to further other policy goals. See generally, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Fence Posts or Sign Posts?  Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1748
(2009) (arguing that patent claims fail to “specify the scope of the rights granted to paten-
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ents did not even have to have claims, and the claim did not become
the core language defining an invention until the late 1800s.37
A patent claim generally contains two pieces: a preamble setting
forth a general description of the invention and a listing of limita-
tions—“elements, steps and/or relationships”—that describe the in-
vention.38  Determining if an accused product or process infringes a
claim requires two steps: first, the language of the claim must be con-
strued, defining the legal scope of the claim; and second, the accused
product or process must be compared to the claim to see whether
each limitation of the patent claim, as construed by the court, is satis-
fied by the accused product or process.39  The accused product or
process must satisfy every limitation of the claimed invention either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents to fall within the scope of
the patent claim; if any limitation is not satisfied, there is no
infringement.40
tees” and suggesting reforms); Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent
Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2011) (arguing that despite the emphasis on claim
construction, “courts select among multiple possible levels of abstraction arbitrarily and
silently”); Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in
Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2234193 (arguing that the problem of ambiguity in patent claims is overstated); Christo-
pher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 56 (2005) (exploring “the relationship between claim interpreta-
tion methodology and patent scope”); Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the “Invention”?, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855 (2012) (arguing that courts deciding claim-construction disputes
are really applying one of two conceptions of the “invention” claimed in a patent); Jeanne
C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009) (discussing the differ-
ent methodologies for claiming exclusive rights used in patent and copyright law); Oskar
Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2012)
(arguing that patent law should pay more attention to the invention claimed in a patent,
rather than solely to the words of the patent’s claims); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000) (discussing various theories of claim interpre-
tation); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
179, 187–91 (2007) (pointing out flaws in patent claims and suggesting methods for en-
hancing public notice in claim construction); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223,
259–60 (2008) (finding that district judges are generally bad at claim construction and
positing the explanation that “[c]laim construction may be inherently indeterminate”).  I
do not grapple with that literature here.  For present purposes, it suffices to say that the
noninfringement inquiry focuses on comparing each accused product or process to each
asserted patent claim, regardless of how that claim is construed.
37 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 798 (5th ed. 2011).
38 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e)(3) (2012); PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(i)(e)(3) (8th ed., rev. 9 2012)
[hereinafter MPEP], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/.
39 Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 842.
40 This is sometimes called the “All Elements Rule” or “All Limitations Rule.” See, e.g.,
Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1577 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1989); ROBERT L. HARMON,
CYNTHIA A. HOMAN & CHARLES M. MCMAHON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
§ 7.1(a)(i), at 467–68 (10th ed. 2011).
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It is worth briefly illustrating how this works with an example.
One of the patents at issue in the ongoing Apple–Samsung
smartphone patent litigation is U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381, which is ti-
tled “List Scrolling and Document Translation, Scaling, and Rotation
on a Touch-Screen Display.”41  As Apple explained in a court filing,
the patent relates to a “method for displaying images on touch
screens: when one uses a finger to drag a displayed page past its bot-
tom edge, for example, and releases the finger, the page bounces
back to fill the full screen.”42  Claim 1 of the ’381 patent, in the typi-
cally impenetrable language of patents, claims the following
invention:
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
at a device with a touch screen display:
displaying a first portion of an electronic document;
detecting a movement of an object on or near the touch screen
display;
in response to detecting the movement, translating the elec-
tronic document displayed on the touch screen display in a first
direction to display a second portion of the electronic docu-
ment, wherein the second portion is different from the first
portion;
in response to an edge of the electronic document being
reached while translating the electronic document in the first
direction while the object is still detected on or near the touch
screen display:
displaying an area beyond the edge of the document, and
displaying a third portion of the electronic document, wherein
the third portion is smaller than the first portion; and
in response to detecting that the object is no longer on or near
the touch screen display, translating the electronic document in
a second direction until the area beyond the edge of the elec-
tronic document is no longer displayed to display a fourth por-
tion of the electronic document, wherein the fourth portion is
different from the first portion.43
In its effort to prove that one accused product, the Samsung Infuse 4G
smartphone, infringed this claim, Apple used a claim chart to com-
pare each of the claim’s limitations to the way the accused phone
worked.  As an example, one line of the chart showed44:
41 U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381 (filed Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter ’381 Patent].
42 Apple Inc.’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139049 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012), ECF No. 86.
43 ’381 Patent claim 1.
44 Apple Inc.’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note 42, at 21. R
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Claim 1 Samsung Infuse 4G 
in response to an edge of 
the electronic document 
being reached while 
translating the electronic 
document in the first 
direction while the object is 
still detected on or near the 
touch screen display: 
displaying an area beyond 
the edge of the document, 
and displaying a third 
portion of the electronic 
document, wherein the 
third portion is smaller than 
the first portion; and 
In response to reaching the edge of an electronic 
document while it is moving in the first direction and 
the finger is still on the touch screen, the Infuse 4G 
displays a black region beyond the edge, and thus 
displays a smaller “third portion” of the document. (See 
Balakrishnan Decl. ¶¶ 42-46, Ex. 13a.) 
 
Figure 3:  
Displaying “area beyond 
edge” and smaller “third 
portion” while moving 
document in first direction 
In response, Samsung argued that the accused smartphone failed to
meet this limitation because the “area beyond the edge of the docu-
ment”—the black area outlined in green in Apple’s photograph—was
not “displayed,” since no light was emitted by the smartphone’s
AMOLED screen when it showed solid black.45  (They also made an-
other argument related to the requirement that the document be
translated in a “first direction.”46)
The dispute over the “displaying” requirement, then, focused on
the first step of the infringement analysis, claim construction.47  Apple
asserted that the accused smartphone “display[ed] an area beyond the
edge of the document” by showing a black region when the photo-
graph (the “document”) was pulled partially offscreen by the user.
Samsung responded that it did not “display” such an area because the
smartphone did not emit light when it displayed black, and the term
“display” requires emitting light.  The court sided with Apple, con-
cluding that “displaying” meant “showing or revealing to the viewer”
since nothing in the patent required the device to emit light as it did
45 Samsung’s Opposition to Apple’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 26–27,
Apple, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139049 (No. 11-CV-01846-LHK), ECF No. 429 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
46 Id. at 27.
47 Cf. Athletic Alts., Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Where, as here, the parties do not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused prod-
uct but disagree over which of two possible meanings of Claim 1 is the proper one, the
question of literal infringement collapses to one of claim construction and is thus amena-
ble to summary judgment.”).
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so.48  It thus found that Apple was likely to be able to prove infringe-
ment of the ’381 patent.49
This pattern is typical for many, if not most, infringement dis-
putes: with little or no dispute about how the accused product or pro-
cess works, the entire ball game comes down to what exactly the
patent claim requires.50  If the patent is construed broadly enough to
encompass the accused product or process, the court is likely to find
infringement.  If instead the patent is construed more narrowly, the
court is unlikely to find infringement.51
3. The (Partial) Independence of Invalidity and Noninfringement
At the highest level, invalidity and noninfringement are indepen-
dent defenses focused on different issues.  Invalidity is focused on the
patent and the universe that existed when the inventor applied for the
patent without regard to the accused product or process.  Nonin-
fringement looks to the patent as it exists now and to the accused
product or process.  The two defenses are thus formally independent:
nothing prevents a defendant from arguing both that the plaintiff’s
asserted patent is invalid and that, regardless, its accused product or
process does not infringe the patent.  A patent issued today on the
broad category of flying vehicles would be invalid because prior art
like the Wright brothers’ airplane, helicopters, and jetpacks would
render its claims non-novel, but a carmaker sued on that patent would
also have an airtight noninfringement defense.
That independence is limited, however, because both defenses
depend on the scope of the patent claims and thus on how the claims
are construed. The basic question of a noninfringement defense—
whether the accused product or process satisfies every limitation of
the patent claim—depends on what those claims mean.  Likewise,
each of the three basic invalidity arguments depends on how a claim is
construed, albeit to varying degrees.
First, determining whether a claim was novel and nonobvious re-
quires comparing the construed claims to the prior art.  If the claimed
invention, as construed by the court, existed in the prior art or was
48 Apple, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139049, at *101–02 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
49 Id. at *106–08.
50 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 375 (1996) (patent
dispute turning on the meaning of “inventory” in the asserted patent claim); Renishaw
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (patent dispute
turning on the meaning of the word “when”).
51 See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 230 (“[I]f the claim language is broad . . . the claim R
should be construed broadly. . . .  [I]f the embodiments described in the detailed descrip-
tion of the patent are all narrow, then the language in the claim must also be narrowly
construed.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-NOV-13 12:38
86 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:71
obvious in view of the prior art, then the claim is invalid.52  But it is
impossible to know whether the prior art disclosed any specific claim
limitation without knowing what exactly that claim limitation means.
Second, determining the scope of the inventor’s mandatory dis-
closures under the written-description, enablement, best-mode, and
definiteness requirements also requires construing the claims.  The
written-description and enablement requirements, for example, re-
quire the inventor to describe fully his or her invention and to enable
others to make full use of it.  If a claim is construed to cover a particu-
lar form of the invention and that form was not described or enabled,
then the patent may be invalid.  If, however, that claim is construed
not to cover that form of the invention, then it does not matter if the
patent described or enabled it.53
And third, determining whether a claim has utility and falls
within the statutory patentable subject matter likewise requires know-
ing what those claims cover—i.e., how courts have construed them.  In
Bilski v. Kappos,54 for instance, the Supreme Court construed two
claims in the petitioner’s patent application to cover the “concept of
hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula
in claim 4.”55  The Court concluded that these proposed claims were
not patentable because granting them would “[a]llow[ ] petitioners to
patent risk hedging,” a “basic concept” and “abstract idea”56 too broad
to constitute a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.”57  If, however, the proposed claims had been construed to
require more than the naked “concept of hedging,” then the claims
might have been patentable.  As Justice John Paul Stevens put it in his
concurring opinion, “the Court artificially limit[ed] petitioners’
claims to hedging, and then conclude[d] that hedging is an abstract
idea rather than a term that describes a category of processes includ-
52 Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly compared the processes of determining
invalidity and infringement, both of which involve comparing something—the prior art, or
the accused product or process—to the patent claims. See Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129
U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (“That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” (quoting
Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 21 F. 319, 321 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[I]t has been well established for over a century that the same test must
be used for both infringement and anticipation.”).
53 This necessarily simplifies a complex question about the scope of a patent’s written
description and enablement.  For a more detailed discussion of the effects of claim con-
struction on the written-description and enablement requirements, see Chiang, supra note
36, at 1131–34; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS R
& CLARK L. REV. 29, 46–52 (2005) (discussing ambiguities in claim construction).
54 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
55 Id. at 3231.
56 Id.
57 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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ing petitioners’ claims.  Why the Court [did] this [was] never made
clear.”58
It is easy to overstate the degree to which invalidity and nonin-
fringement are related.  Invalidity is, at its core, about what came
before the invention (the prior art) and what is disclosed in the patent
document (the written description and other specification).  Nonin-
fringement, in contrast, is essentially about the accused product or
process, which has little or nothing to do with the prior art and the
patent’s specification.  But claim construction plays an important
role—sometimes the critical role—in each determination, so the two
issues are not wholly independent.
B. Invalid Patents
Patents are granted after a review by the PTO, which must make
sure that an applicant “is entitled to a patent under the law” before
granting the patent.59  To make this determination, patent examiners
review the patent application, perform their own search for prior art,
and determine if the proposed patent claims meet the patentability
rules.60  If a proposed claim fails one of the specific requirements of
patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, or 103, the examiner
must reject the application; otherwise the PTO must issue the re-
quested patent.61
Despite this review, many invalid patents make it through prose-
cution, creating significant problems for companies and individuals
that want to make and sell new products and services.  Though schol-
ars—and much of the public—basically agree that this is a serious
problem, there is far less agreement about the best solution.
1. The Problem
Among patent scholars, there is almost unanimous agreement
that patent examiners do not do their job particularly well, with the
58 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Ul-
tramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, No. 2010-1544, 2013 WL 3111303, at *3–4 (Fed. Cir. June 21,
2013) (observing that claim construction will usually be required before a court will find a
patent claim invalid under § 101).
59 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006).
60 See generally MPEP, supra note 38, § 704–704.14 (describing the examiner’s prior-art R
search and setting forth the kinds of information a patent examiner may require an appli-
cant to submit); id. § 904–904.03 (providing instructions on how to conduct a prior-art
search).
61 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (“[I]f on . . . examination it appears that the applicant is enti-
tled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor.”).  Accordingly,
the burden of proof is on a patent examiner to justify denying a requested patent. In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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PTO issuing many invalid patents.62  Indeed, nearly half of all litigated
patents that make it to a final judgment are invalidated by the
courts.63  And this statistic may understate the number of invalid pat-
ents in force since very few patents are litigated and since patent hold-
ers have an opportunity and an incentive to choose those patents and
claims that are more likely to survive judicial review.64
There are different explanations for the PTO’s less-than-effective
screening system.  First, patent examiners have little incentive to reject
bad patent applications and every incentive to grant more patents.
Rejecting an application creates more work for an examiner since he
or she must justify the rejection and since it likely results in another
round of dialogue with the applicant.  Approving an application, how-
ever, gets the file off the examiner’s desk for good.65  And the PTO
has at times encouraged this approach, famously asserting that its “pri-
mary mission” is “to help customers get patents.”66
Second, even if they wanted to, patent examiners may just be too
overwhelmed to catch bad patents.  In recent years, the PTO has re-
ceived more than 500,000 patent applications per year and granted
62 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 11; Joseph R
Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 943, 944–46 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495–97 & nn.1–4 (2001); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589–91 (1999); Sawicki, supra note 21, at 736; R. Polk Wagner, Under- R
standing Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2139–45 (2009).
63 Allison & Lemley, supra note 6, at 205–07.  This does not mean, by the way, that R
district courts are effectively doing their job of invalidating bad patents since very few cases
make it to a final decision on validity.
64 See Lemley, supra note 62, at 1501–03 (observing that a “tiny number” of patents R
are litigated each year).  Conversely, it might be the case that only the close calls make it to
a final determination because most patents are valid and defendants choose to license the
patents in settlement.  But parties settle cases for many reasons, including reducing the risk
of an adverse outcome, so it is hard to know how much we can infer from the statistics. See,
e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984) (observing that because most disputes are settled out of court and settle-
ments occur in the shadow of governing legal rules, it is difficult or impossible to infer
overall trends applicable to legal disputes by observing litigation outcomes).
65 Lemley, supra note 62, at 1496 n.3; see also Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, R
Monetary and Implicit Incentives of Patent Examiners (Univ. of Alta. Dep’t of Econ., Working
Paper No. 2009-22, 2009), available at http://www.economics.ualberta.ca/~/media/eco
nomics/FacultyAndStaff/WPs/WP2009-22-Langinier.pdf (concluding that rewarding pat-
ent examiners for rejecting applications, rather than for allowing patents, would give ex-
aminers greater incentives to search for information).  There is evidence that examiners
act more quickly and grant more patents when it is economically advantageous to the PTO
for them to do so. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67,
101–18 (2013) (analyzing the influence of the PTO’s budget structure on patent
decisions).
66 PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FY2001 CORPORATE PLAN
23 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/pt04.pdf.
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almost 250,000 patents per year.67  A patent examiner spends just
eighteen hours on the average patent application—spread out over a
year or two—in which he or she must review the application; conduct
a prior-art search; review both the prior art submitted by the applicant
and that uncovered in the search; compare the prior art to the
claimed invention; go through multiple rounds of office actions (writ-
ten statements finding claims patentable or not and if not, explaining
why not) and responses to office actions; perhaps conduct an inter-
view with the applicant; and ensure the application complies with vari-
ous formalities.68  And third, patent examiners often lack the
information needed to determine whether a patent application
should be approved.  Though patent examiners do specialize in a par-
ticular technology area, they are not experts; most have a bachelor’s
or master’s degree and less than three years of experience examining
patent applications.69  Nor can examiners benefit from the perspec-
tives provided by an adversarial process since patent prosecution is
conducted ex parte.70
The resulting invalid patents have pernicious effects on individu-
als and companies that create new products and services, effects that
are exacerbated by the sheer scale of the modern patent system.71  It is
67 PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS
CHART: CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2012 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/of
fices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.  Notably, this does not mean that examiners actually
reject half of the patent applications filed; an applicant who receives a “final rejection” can
refile the same application over and over again until the examiner approves of some pat-
ent claims or the applicant decides to appeal. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.53 (2013) (detail-
ing the filing requirements for a patent application).  The real patent-approval rate is in
the neighborhood of 70%. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Application Outcomes: Rising Allowances
and Falling Abandonments, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2012/12/patent-application-outcomes-rising-allowances-and-falling-abandonments.html.
68 Lemley, supra note 62, at 1496 n.3. R
69 See Tamara Dillon, Patent Work: The Other Side of Invention, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
Q., Fall 2009, at 18, 21; Patent Examiner Experience Levels, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 5, 2010), http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/patent-examiner-experience-levels.html.  Turnover
is a significant problem at the agency, with one examiner leaving for every two hired even
as the office tries to expand significantly. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-
1102, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE
THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG (2007).
70 See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Valid-
ity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 54–56 (2007); Victor Wong, Going from Inquisitorial to Adversarial,
YALE J.L. & TECH. (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.yalelawtech.org/ip-in-the-digital-age/going-
from-inquisitorial-to-adversarial/.
71 About nine million U.S. patents have been issued since the launch of the patent
system in the 1790s, of which more than two million are still in force. See USPTO PATENT
FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE, http://patft.uspto.gov (follow “Advanced Search” hyper-
link; choose option for “1790 to present [entire database]” from “Select Years” menu;
search “isd/1/1/1790->1/1/2014”; then click “search” button) (searched Sept. 29, 2013)
(finding 9,278,679 patents issued since 1790); Dennis Crouch, How Many US Patents Are In-
Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/how-many-
us-patents-are-in-force.html.
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no longer the case, if it ever was, that a single invention is likely to be
covered by a single patent; today, it is far more likely that a new prod-
uct is covered by thousands of patents.72  Such “patent thickets” im-
pose a significant tax on innovation since a company must, at least in
theory, obtain licenses to all those thousands of patents before it in-
troduces a new product.73  Invalid patents multiply the size of this tax
since the holder of an invalid patent will want a royalty just as much as
the holder of a valid patent will.  Patent litigants, like all litigants, are
risk averse, with both sides having incentives to license even invalid
patents.74  Potential infringers might choose to do so both because of
the sheer scale of the patent-thicket problem—sorting thousands of
potentially relevant patents into groups of valid and invalid patents
would be a monumental undertaking—and because patent litigation
is uncertain enough that paying the tax is simpler and cheaper than
fighting.75  Fighting is a risk because any patent holder can block, or
attempt to block, the accused infringer’s activity; although injunctions
are no longer almost automatic when a patent holder prevails in
court,76 they are still a significant risk, especially when multiplied
across thousands of patents.77  And patent holders are, of course,
72 This is especially the case in the information-technology industry, where innovation
is an iterative process by which new features and technologies build incrementally on each
other.  In contrast, the pharmaceutical industry may be a notable exception because phar-
maceutical patents can precisely claim a particular molecule, because pharmaceutical-pat-
ent claims that are broad and vague enough to apply to many innovations are rare, and
because the pharmaceutical industry relies more than many industries on concentrated
high-fixed-cost investment that is a better match for patent protection. See generally BURK &
LEMLEY, supra note 11, at 37–65 (describing the industry-specific nature of the patent sys- R
tem); see also Alexander Tabarrok, Patent Theory Versus Patent Law, 1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no. 1, 2002, art. 9, at 19 (suggesting that patent law may be more
necessary in the pharmaceutical industry than in other industries because the ratio of inno-
vation costs to imitation costs is higher in the pharmaceutical industry).
73 See supra note 13; see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating R
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1799–819 (2007) (discussing the role of in-
formation costs in intellectual property).  Patent thickets are particularly important in in-
dustries like the information-technology industry in which improvements happen through
incremental changes and recombinations of previous technologies.  See, e.g., Adam Mos-
soff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s,
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 171–82 (2011) (describing the history of incremental innovation that
led to a patent thicket in sewing-machine technology).  One surprisingly common re-
sponse to patent thickets is simply to ignore them. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 20–22. R
74 As in most types of litigation, most patent lawsuits are settled—not counting the
many patent disputes that are settled before litigation. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 10, at R
271–74; infra Part II.C.
75 See generally Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market
and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 76–95
(2006) (examining transaction costs in patent disputes).
76 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (outlining the test
for granting permanent injunctions in patent cases).
77 In the three years after eBay was decided, district courts granted permanent injunc-
tions in forty-eight out of sixty-seven cases in which successful patent plaintiffs sought
them.  Ernest Grumbles III, Rachel C. Hughey & Susan Perera, The Three Year Anniversary of
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happy to collect licensing revenue and are likely willing to discount
their royalties to avoid the risk of an invalidity judgment.
2. Three Solutions
Scholars and patent practitioners have proposed three types of
solutions to the problem of invalid patents.
First, better review by the PTO could lead to fewer bad patents
being granted.78  Expanding the number of patent examiners, the
amount of time examiners can spend on each patent application, or
the ability of examiners to track down prior-art references79 could
make it easier for examiners to figure out when a patent application
claims something that is truly new, and thus to distinguish between
valid and invalid patents.  Requiring patent applicants to provide ex-
aminers with more information, such as the results of a comprehen-
sive prior-art search, would also give examiners more information to
work with.80  Likewise, finding ways to reduce examiner turnover
could lead to examiners who are more experienced and knowledgea-
ble, and thus better able to distinguish between valid and invalid pat-
eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
Nov. 2009, at 25, 26.
78 See, e.g., Robert D. Atkinson & Daniel D. Castro, A National Technology Agenda for the
New Administration, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 190, 192–94 (2009); Wade M. Chumney, David L.
Baumer & Roby B. Sawyers, Patents Gone Wild: An Ethical Examination and Legal Analysis of
Tax-Related and Tax Strategy Patents, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 343, 402 (2009); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots
and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 (2002); Merges,
supra note 62, at 600–15 (making suggestions for improving the examination process); Arti R
K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Manage-
rial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2080–81 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office
8–12 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 422,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023958; see also Michael Abramowicz & John
F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1576–601 (2009) (propos-
ing expanded competition in patent examination); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 70, at R
61–63 (proposing a system by which a patent applicant can pay for extra-rigorous patent
prosecution and receive a “gold-plated” patent); Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent
Quality with Applicant Incentives (Aug. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147491 (proposing ways to give patent applicants incentives to
pursue narrower patent claims).
79 The America Invents Act, which was signed into law in 2011, makes one kind of
information more easily available to examiners: it permits third parties to submit prior-art
information relevant to any application before the examiner issues a notice of allowance.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284, 315–16 (2011)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(e) (Supp. V 2011)).
80 Such a requirement was, at one point, included in a draft patent-reform bill,
though it did not make it into the America Invents Act. See Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable
Conduct Gyre Widens, 50 IDEA 215, 244–45 (2010) (reporting a proposal to require patent
applicants to submit to the PTO “a search report and other information and analysis rele-
vant to patentability” (quoting H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Patent Reform: Required Pre-Filing Search and Patentability Analysis, PATENTLY-
O (July 18, 2007), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/07/patent-reform-r.html
(same).
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ents.81  But all these measures would be expensive, and it is unclear
whether they would be worth the expense since most patents are
never enforced.82
Second, various forms of administrative review by the PTO after a
patent has been granted could invalidate bad patents.83  This ap-
proach provides a form of adversarial argument, with members of the
public—usually potential infringers—playing a role in initiating, and
sometimes litigating, the administrative review.  It also shifts some of
the burden of identifying bad patents to the public, who can provide
information to the PTO and challenge a patent’s validity without un-
dergoing the greater burden of litigating the dispute.  It also allows
the PTO to concentrate its resources on the patents that are impor-
tant enough to merit further review.  These advantages have led many
scholars and policymakers to embrace various forms of post-grant re-
view.84  But this approach could apply only to the few patents that are
important enough to receive extra scrutiny and not the far-larger cate-
gory of patents, many invalid, that are never litigated or seriously con-
tested.  It would thus do little to combat the patent-thicket problem.
Third, district courts can and do invalidate patents in litigation,
both in standard patent-infringement litigation and in declara-
tory-judgment claims brought by potential infringement defendants.
Like administrative review, litigation concentrates on a small fraction
of patents and benefits from an adversarial process, but unlike admin-
istrative review it is extraordinarily expensive and time-consuming.
And it is imperfectly suited for invalidating bad patents since much of
a typical case is consumed by unrelated infringement issues and since
district courts must apply a presumption of validity.  District courts
also lack expertise and have other structural shortcomings that limit
81 The PTO has itself taken this approach in recent years, hiring scores of new exam-
iners and opening or announcing new satellite offices staffed with patent examiners in
Detroit, Denver, Dallas–Fort Worth, and Silicon Valley. See David Kappos, Progress Report on
Satellite Office Openings, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/progress_report_on_satellite_office.
82 See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 S.
CT. REV. 293, 345–46 (discussing the validity of unenforced patents); Lemley, supra note
62, at 1514–15 (same); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL R
ANALYSIS 687, 706 (2010) (discussing unenforced patents).
83 As modified by the America Invents Act, there are three forms of post-grant admin-
istrative review available in the U.S. patent system: ex parte reexamination, see 35 U.S.C.
§§ 302–307 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); inter partes review, see id. §§ 311–319 (Supp. V 2011);
and post-grant review, see id. §§ 321–329 (Supp. V 2011). See also Andrei Iancu & Ben
Haber, Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents Act, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
476 (2012).
84 See, e.g., Farrell & Merges, supra note 62, at 967; Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamina- R
tion: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 93–111 (1997); cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (ex parte reexamination); id. §§ 311–319
(inter partes reexamination); id. §§ 321–329 (post-grant review).  On the relative merits of
pre- and post-grant procedures, see Kesan & Gallo, supra note 75, at 109–12. R
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their ability to decide complex technological cases like patent law-
suits.85  Moreover, potential infringers have imperfect incentives to
challenge patents as invalid.86  These and other factors mean that liti-
gation challenges to patent validity have high error costs.87  Scholars
have nevertheless proposed ways to make litigation a more useful tool
in invalidating bad patents.88
Which of these three mechanisms is best is to some degree beside
the point.  We need not choose a single mechanism for weeding out
bad patents; rather, the goal should be to make each mechanism as
effective as it can be without sacrificing other goals.89  If we can make
one mechanism more cost-effective at preventing an invalid patent
from being issued, or at eliminating it after the fact without affecting
the other mechanisms or producing other adverse consequences, we
should do so.  Accordingly, the next Part discusses a substantial im-
pediment to the use of litigation to invalidate patents.
II
THE DEFENDANT’S CHOICE: INVALIDITY VERSUS
NONINFRINGEMENT
This Part introduces the trade-offs and asymmetries between pat-
ent invalidity and noninfringement that lead many defendants to
choose to focus on just one of the two defenses, and in many cases to
prefer to focus on noninfringement.
A. Trade-Offs
An accused infringer fighting a patent lawsuit makes many impor-
tant strategic decisions in the course of litigating the case, but proba-
85 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent Laboratories, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
307, 313–19 (2011).
86 See Farrell & Merges, supra note 62, at 950–60 (analyzing skewed incentives in pat- R
ent litigation).
87 See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO.
L.J. 637, 658–76 (2013) (proposing a set of enhanced rewards and penalties to mitigate
error costs in patent litigation).
88 See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for De-
feating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 704–30 (2004) (proposing a litigation-based
bounty scheme); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Propo-
sal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 340–47 (proposing that the PTO pay boun-
ties to members of the public who provide information leading to the rejection of patent
applications); Edward Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent
Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 692–93 (2004) (proposing mandatory joinder of all infring-
ers into a single patent case to eliminate the collective-action problem in challenging pat-
ent validity); Matthew K.K. Sumida, Note, Defendant Class Actions and Patent Infringement
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 843, 881–86 (2011) (proposing the use of defendant class
actions to resolve patent disputes).
89 Cf. Sawicki, supra note 21 (discussing potential mistakes at different points in a R
patent’s lifetime and analyzing which mistakes are better and worse for society).
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bly the most critical one is what arguments to make in defense.  In
nearly every patent case, the two leading candidates are invalidity and
noninfringement.  And as discussed above, invalidity and noninfringe-
ment are distinct issues that can be argued simultaneously.90  Yet sev-
eral trade-offs exist between invalidity and noninfringement so that
patent defendants face pressure to focus on one or the other.
For both invalidity and noninfringement, the defendant is usually
the party that decides whether the issue will be seriously contested.
This is straightforward for invalidity, which is an affirmative defense
that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and so can only
come up as an issue if raised by the defendant.91  The point is less
obvious with noninfringement since the plaintiff has the burden of
proving infringement and must meet that burden to win the case.92
In practice, though, meeting this burden is relatively simple if the de-
fendant does not put effort into a counterargument; the plaintiff can
typically rely on an expert witness, testifying at a relatively high level of
generality, that the accused product or process satisfies every limita-
tion of the asserted claims.  The issue is really only contested when the
defendant argues that the accused product or process is missing cer-
tain claim limitations.
That the defendant chooses what issues to contest is a rather ba-
nal point, but it has profound consequences in patent litigation be-
cause defendants usually choose to focus on one or the other of the
two defenses.  Several trade-offs penalize patent defendants who try to
keep both defenses alive even if they both could have merit in any
particular case.  These trade-offs include trade-offs in claim-construc-
tion strategy, the need for a coherent trial narrative, and resource
constraints.
1. Claim-Construction Strategy
The biggest factor pushing patent litigants toward focusing on
one defense is the need for a claim-construction strategy that supports
that defense.  One of the important strategic decisions a patent liti-
gant makes is what claim constructions to propose and argue for.  It is
often difficult or impossible to construe claims in a way that is compat-
ible with both invalidity and noninfringement arguments, so the
choice of claim constructions can act as a fork in the road, forcing
defendants to choose one or the other.  And because claim construc-
90 See supra Part I.A.3.
91 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“A patent shall be presumed
valid. . . .  The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest
on the party asserting such invalidity.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238,
2240 (2011) (holding that invalidity must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
92 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for in-
fringement of his patent.”).
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tion is such a malleable and uncertain process, and unusually depen-
dent on facts for a question of law, the parties’ arguments have a
disproportionate impact on the court’s ultimate claim constructions.93
In many patent cases—perhaps most patent cases—the defen-
dant must choose between arguing for broad claim constructions that
support its invalidity arguments and arguing for narrow claim con-
structions that support its noninfringement arguments.94  Narrow
claim constructions, in general, are better for noninfringement argu-
ments because fewer products and processes will fall into narrow
claims than into broad ones.  Narrow claim constructions make it
harder to prove invalidity, though, because fewer prior-art references
will describe elements of a narrower claim.  Similarly, broad claim
constructions make it harder to argue noninfringement since it is eas-
ier to prove that a product or process falls within a broader category
than a narrower category, while broad claim constructions make it eas-
ier to argue invalidity since more prior art can anticipate or render
obvious a patent claim.95  As the famed patent judge Giles Rich
quipped decades ago, “[t]he stronger a patent the weaker it is and the
weaker a patent the stronger it is.”96
93 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (noting the unpredictability of claim
construction); Schwartz, supra note 36, at 259–60 (“Claim construction may be inherently R
indeterminate.”).
94 In the American patent system, the meaning of a claim’s language is a question of
law to be resolved by the court.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384
(1996).  Generally, partway through a case, the parties will meet and confer to discuss
which claim terms are in need of construction and will propose constructions.  For terms
for which the parties cannot agree on constructions, the parties will submit proposed claim
constructions and supporting briefs to the court.  The court will then hold a hearing called
a Markman hearing; consider the parties’ arguments; and construe the claims.  See, e.g.,
N.D. CAL. LOC. PAT. R. 4-1 to 4-7 (providing for claim-construction proceedings); E.D. TEX.
PAT. R. 4-1 to 4-6 (same); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (discussing the roles of law and fact in claim construction); id. at 1332–33
(Mayer, J., dissenting) (same); MODEL LOCAL PATENT RULES R. 4-1 to 4-7 (Intellectual Prop.
Owners Ass’n 2009) (providing for claim-construction proceedings).  Claim construction is
essentially the midterm of a patent case, with expert reports that rely on the construed
claims, dispositive motions, and trial usually coming later.
95 These trade-offs between narrow and broad claim constructions have been repeat-
edly recognized by scholars and practitioners. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Advantages
of Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 581 (2008) (“[T]he
ideal tactical posture for an accused infringer is to receive a broad claim construction for
invalidity analysis but maintain a narrower claim construction for infringement analysis;
with patent holders preferring the opposite.  Keenly aware of such potential gamesman-
ship by both sides, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that claims must be construed
consistently between the two analyses.”); Matthew B. Lowrie, Critical Issues in Managing Pat-
ent Litigation, 44 IDEA 267, 280 (2004) (“The strategy issues related to what claim construc-
tion to ask for also fundamentally impact a patent litigation.  The trade-off typically
involves whether to ask for a broad construction (infringement is easier, but validity more
difficult) or a narrow construction (same, but in reverse).”).
96 Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
641, 644 (1967) (emphasis omitted).
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A classic example of the importance of broader and narrower
claim constructions is Nystrom v. TREX Co.97  Nystrom concerned a pat-
ent covering boards used to build outdoor decks.98  The patent
claimed to solve a problem with standard flat deck boards, which
would accumulate water, leading to decay.  The patent described a
slightly rounded board that, when oriented so the convex side faced
up, would shed water to the sides of each board.  Figure 2 of the pat-
ent showed a cross section of the invention99:
Although the specification of the patent described a board milled
from solid wood logs and repeatedly discussed wooden boards,100 the
asserted claims just used the term “board” without specifying the ma-
terial from which the board was made.101  Nystrom sued TREX, a com-
pany that made composite deck boards made out of a mixture of
wood fibers and plastic.102
The asserted patent claimed a “board for use in constructing a
flooring surface for exterior use” satisfying various other limita-
tions.103  The parties disagreed about the proper construction of the
97 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  I borrow this example from Dave Schwartz. See
Schwartz, supra note 36, at 231–33. R
98 See Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1140; U.S. Patent No. 5,474,831 (filed July 13, 1992) [here-
inafter ’831 Patent].
99 ’831 Patent fig. 2.
100 E.g., id. at col. 1, ll. 27–37 (“wood flooring for exterior use”); id. at col. 1, ll. 48–55
(“[V]ery little change has been made in the basic design of wood building materials . . . .”);
id. at col. 3, ll. 25–35 (“growth rings” and “bark side”).
101 See id. at claims 1–15, 18–20.
102 Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1140.
103 ’831 Patent at claim 1.  The full language of claim 1, one of several similar asserted
claims, reads:
1. A board for use in constructing a flooring surface for exterior use, said
board having a top surface, a bottom surface and opposite side edges, said
top surface being manufactured to have a slightly rounded or curved con-
figuration from a longitudinal center line thereof downwardly toward each
side edge, thereby defining a convex top surface which sheds water and at
the same time is comfortable to walk on, and said bottom surface having a
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term “board,” among other claim terms.  The plaintiff proposed a
broad construction for “board,” suggesting it meant “an elongated
piece of construction material for use in building” regardless of the
material from which the board was made.104  The defendant proposed
a narrower construction, under which “board” meant “wood board cut
from a log” or “solid all wood board.”105
The defendant’s narrower construction gave it an airtight nonin-
fringement case: since its boards were made from a wood–plastic com-
posite and not just wood cut from a log, they would not satisfy every
limitation of a claim that required solid-wood boards.106  The plaintiff
would have a better shot under its broader construction since a board
can be “an elongated piece of construction material for use in build-
ing” regardless of whether it is made from wood, metal, stone, or a
wood–plastic composite.  A greater universe of boards would infringe
such a broadly construed claim.
Although Nystrom was decided on the issue of infringement, the
point applies just as well to invalidity.  If a court construes “board” to
require a solid-wood board milled from a log, then the universe of
relevant prior art is limited to solid-wood boards or, perhaps, boards
made from other materials that would make a solid-wood board obvi-
ous.  If a “board” can be made out of any building material, then the
universe of prior art expands significantly.  Yet anything in the prior
art that satisfies a claim’s limitations can invalidate a patent; the prior
art does not need to anticipate or render obvious every possible board
covered by the claim.107  If the prior art contained steel planks or
stone slabs that met each of the claim limitations at issue in Nystrom,
then the claims would be found invalid regardless of whether the
prior art anticipated solid-wood or composite boards.  So anything
that expands the universe of prior art makes it easier to prove
invalidity.
This strategic dynamic means that parties often go all in on either
invalidity or noninfringement, arguing for broad claim constructions
concave configuration for nesting engagement with the top surface of an-
other board so that a plurality of the boards may be stacked one on top of
the other with the stability of conventional boards having flat top and bot-
tom surfaces.
Id.
104 Nystrom v. TREX Co., No. 2:01-cv-905, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27501, at *10 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 19, 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in part,
424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
105 Id. at *10 & n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 Indeed, Nystrom conceded noninfringement, 424 F.3d at 1140–41, after the dis-
trict court construed “board” to mean “piece of elongated construction material made
from wood cut from a log,” 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27501, at *16.
107 Cf. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“Anticipation requires a showing that each element of the claim at issue, properly
construed, is found in a single prior art reference.”).
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that shore up their invalidity arguments or narrow claim constructions
that shore up their noninfringement arguments.  The alternative can
be middle-of-the-road constructions that do not help either defense
enough to be successful.  Unless the defendant’s case is unusually
strong, then, claim-construction strategy can force the defendant to
jettison one defense in favor of the other.
2. Trial Narratives
Even if a defendant pursues both invalidity and noninfringement
defenses at the start of a case, the need for a simple, coherent narra-
tive of the case will often lead that defendant to focus on one defense
or the other by the time the case reaches trial.108  Every (good) trial
lawyer tries to simplify his or her case and tell jurors a straightforward,
appealing story that just happens to support his or her client’s side.109
The need for this simple narrative is only magnified in patent trials,
which otherwise stack complexity upon complexity.  Many patents and
accused products and processes are technically advanced and difficult
even for experts to understand—understandably so, since patents by
their nature protect new inventions.  Invalidity and noninfringement
are themselves complex legal concepts that can be difficult for jurors
to understand.  And invalidity and noninfringement have little in
common, making it even harder to keep track of both simultaneously.
Trial lawyers are smart to focus on a simple narrative, even at the
cost of a potential defense.  Jurors hear competing stories from the
plaintiff and the defense, and they must decide which story is more
credible.  Yet studies of jury psychology show that the credibility a ju-
ror assigns to a story is based not on the strength of the evidence but
on the narrative plausibility of a party’s arguments.  A juror constructs
108 Patent cases go to trial relatively often compared with other federal civil cases.  In
one study, for instance, 251 cases were decided by trial verdicts, compared to 377 decided
in summary judgment, a ratio of one trial for every 1.5 summary judgments.  Kesan & Ball,
supra note 10, at 273–74.  In federal civil cases as a whole, the ratio is closer to 2.5 summary R
judgments per trial. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in
Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591,
616 (2004) (finding, based on data covering civil cases over four years in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, that about 4.1% of cases ended in summary judgment, compared to
1.6% in trials).  As with other kinds of cases, settlements are common, but if a case is likely
to make it to judgment, then a trial is likely enough that we should expect parties to con-
sider it when making strategic decisions.
109 This advice is ubiquitous in books on trial strategy.  The first four chapters of one
trial-advocacy treatise, for instance, are titled “Storytelling,” “Storyboarding,” “Theming,”
and “Story Structure.” RUSS M. HERMAN, COURTROOM PERSUASION 2D: WINNING WITH ART,
DRAMA AND SCIENCE, at xvii (2009); see also, e.g., MARILYN J. BERGER, JOHN B. MITCHELL &
RONALD H. CLARK, TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 238–45 (2d ed.
2008) (advocating crafting an argument as a “[b]elievable [s]tory”); PAUL BERGMAN, TRIAL
ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL 13–90 (5th ed. 2013) (“Part 1.  Strategies for Developing Argu-
ment-Centered Narratives”).
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his or her own internal narrative representation of a case based on the
evidence and his or her background knowledge.  The juror then uses
this narrative representation, not the raw evidence, to reach a ver-
dict.110  And a patent holder can always present a simple, plausible
narrative: “We invented this great new widget, and the defendant used
(or stole) our idea.”  A defendant can counter with its own simple
narrative of invalidity (“The plaintiff didn’t invent anything”) or non-
infringement (“Our product is fundamentally different”)—but only if
it focuses on one defense.  Otherwise, the response is a story that pulls
in multiple directions: “Our product is fundamentally different from
this thing the plaintiff invented—which, by the way, wasn’t actually
new but had been invented before by this other inventor, or would
have been obvious to any idiot in the field.”  Such a narrative is less
coherent and less intuitively plausible than the plaintiff’s simple narra-
tive.111  Indeed, such a story might even come across to jurors as some
sort of too-good-to-be-true shell game, with a sort of “heads I win, tails
you lose” quality.112
Bench trials could help since lawyers and judges may be better
able than jurors to track multiple complex narratives simultaneously,
yet most patent cases that go to trial are tried before juries.  There are
two reasons for this.  First, a patent holder has a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial, though certain equitable issues—like injunctions
and the defense of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct—are
decided by the judge.113  Second, juries are more likely than judges to
110 See Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 462–73
(1995) (analyzing juror decision making); Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremp-
tory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 419 (2010)
(“The plausibility of a story, though, depends on one’s perspective and one’s experience
with the subject matter of the story.”).  This reliance on narratives may not be a good thing.
See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 301–12 (2013) (warning
against narrative bias).
111 Arguably, trial narratives weigh not just in favor of choosing one defense but in
favor of noninfringement. See Roger Shang & Yar Chaikovsky, Inter Partes Reexamination of
Patents: An Empirical Evaluation, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 25 (2006) (“Seasoned patent
litigators almost always prefer to focus on the noninfringement argument at trial, because,
among other reasons, an argument of ‘we don’t infringe’ sounds more moral to a jury than
an argument of ‘maybe we infringe but other people invented this first[ ]’ . . . .”).
112 Thanks to Joe Miller for this point.
113 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (distinguish-
ing the right to a jury trial of infringement issues from other matters that fall within the
court’s equitable powers); Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 F.3d 1272, 1276–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(distinguishing the right to a jury trial of state-law issues from equitable issues decided by a
judge); Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (al-
lowing an inequitable conduct claim to be decided without a jury); DONALD S. CHISUM, 6
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (2012) (discussing Gardco and stating that “a district court may
properly hold a separate trial directed solely to the issue of inequitable conduct in advance
of a trial on the issues of infringement and validity even though the patentee had properly
demanded trial by jury on those issues”).
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find in favor of patent holders.114  Although some judicial districts are
considered more favorable than others to patent holders, plaintiffs
can usually choose where to file patent lawsuits.115  And patent hold-
ers have made aggressive use of that power, favoring districts like the
Eastern District of Texas that are believed to be friendly to
plaintiffs.116
114 See Mark A. Lemley, Jamie Kendall & Clint Martin, Rush to Judgment?: Trial Length
and Outcomes in Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 169, 172–77 (2013) (finding, in a study of all
patent trials over 11.5 years, that juries were significantly more likely to find in favor of
patent holders, even controlling for differences in the kinds of cases tried by judges and
juries).  This is consistent with the conventional wisdom among patent litigators. See, e.g.,
ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK
ch. 6.IX.B (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 3d ed. 2010) (discussing strategic
considerations in deciding whether to demand a jury trial); 5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COUNSELING & LITIGATION § 82.02 (Lester Horwitz et al. eds., 2012) (“[A] plaintiff with a
weak patent should seek a jury, since jurors will give more deference to the beribboned
patent than the Judge.”); John M. Griem, Jr. & Emily Jayne Kunz, Jury Trials in Patent Cases:
Practical and Legal Considerations, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Jan. 2007, at 1 (discussing strate-
gic considerations in deciding whether to demand a jury trial).
115 Although the general rule is that as long as the court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to significant deference, a defendant
can seek to transfer the case to another district court “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice.”  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  An exten-
sive case law has developed in the Federal Circuit governing transfer motions in patent
cases, as numerous defendants, especially in cases pending in the Eastern District of Texas,
have petitioned for writs of mandamus directing district judges to transfer cases to districts
preferred by the defendants. See, e.g., In re Verizon Bus. Network Servs., 635 F.3d 559, 561
(Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Vis-
taprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252,
1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffmann–La Roche Inc.,
587 F.3d 1333, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2009); In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 566 F.3d 1349, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech
USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  (Disclosure: I was counsel to petitioner
Microsoft Corp. in the Acer America Corp. mandamus petition.  The opinions stated in this
Article are solely my own, and nothing in this Article is based on confidential information
learned in the course of that representation.)
116 See, e.g., Julie Blackman, Ellen Brickman & Corinne Brenner, East Texas Jurors and
Patent Litigation, JURY EXPERT, Mar. 2010, at 5.  For what it’s worth, while the Lemley,
Kendall & Martin study finds jury-trial success rates that vary across districts consistently
with the conventional wisdom, the differences are  “not statistically significant once we
factor in the number of patents, the number of defendants, whether a judge or a jury
decided the issue, whether there were non-patent issues in the case, and whether the case
resulted in a split decision.”  Lemley, Kendall & Martin, supra note 114, at 184.  The au- R
thors in that study found, for example, win rates by patent holders of 70.8% in the Eastern
District of Texas, a district usually seen as patent-friendly, compared to 44.4% in the North-
ern District of California, a district usually seen as patent-skeptical. See id. at 184–85.  It is
also possible that districts are seen as patent-friendly because they produce larger verdicts.
The Eastern District of Texas, for instance, has produced two of the five largest patent
verdicts in American history—but then the Northern District of California produced one
of the others. See Apple–Samsung Verdict Third Largest Ever in U.S. Patent Litigation: Lex
Machina Data Confirms Historic Nature of Verdict, LEX MACHINA (Aug. 24, 2012), https://
lexmachina.com/2012/08/24/apple-samsung-verdict-third-largest-ever-in-u-s-patent-litiga
tion/.  Those five verdicts, as of December 30, 2012, were reached in these cases: (1) Centi-
ocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbot Labs., No. 2:07-cv-139-TJW (E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009) ($1.67
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3. Resource Constraints
Resource constraints also create a trade-off between invalidity and
noninfringement, though the importance of the trade-off depends
greatly on the stakes in the case.  Patent cases are notoriously expen-
sive to litigate.  A 2011 survey of patent lawyers estimated that the me-
dian cost of litigating a patent case to final decision was $2.5 million,
when between $1 million and $25 million was at stake.117  If more
than $25 million was at stake, this estimated cost doubled to $5 mil-
lion.118  Besides attorneys’ fees, parties can spend heavily on expert
fees, expenses from investigating the accused product or process, and
searching for prior art.
Very few of these expenses apply to both invalidity and nonin-
fringement arguments, so the marginal cost of pursuing both defenses
can be substantial.  Consider, for instance, the steps involved in prov-
ing a patent invalid.  First, generally, the patent and its prosecution
history are analyzed—by patent litigators, technical experts, or both—
to determine what the relevant patent claims cover and what the criti-
cal issues are likely to be.  Second, a prior-art search is conducted to
build a universe of relevant prior art.  Third, the prior art and the
relevant patent claims are compared to determine what limitations of
the patent are covered by the prior art, what invalidity arguments can
be made, and what the weaknesses are in those arguments.  Fourth,
proposed claim constructions that support the defendant’s invalidity
arguments are developed.  Fifth, legal arguments, expert opinions,
and supporting evidence are developed.  Of all these steps, only the
initial examination of the patent and prosecution history and the de-
velopment of proposed claim constructions are likely to be relevant
both for invalidity and noninfringement—and even then, those steps
are likely to take longer and involve more debate if they must support
two different defenses instead of just one.  The other steps involving
prior art are irrelevant for noninfringement arguments, and expert
and legal work will rarely overlap.119  And, of course, proving nonin-
billion verdict, later overturned on appeal); (2) Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No. 3:02-
cv-2060-B-CAB (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007) ($1.52 billion verdict, later overturned by the
court); (3) Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-cv-1846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012)
($1.05 billion verdict, currently on appeal); (4) Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours &
Co., 4:09-cv-686-ERW (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2012) ($1 billion verdict, case is ongoing); and (5)
Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-88 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2010) ($626 million
verdict, later overturned on appeal).
117 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at I-
153 (2011).
118 Id.
119 The best practice is to have separate paid experts for invalidity and noninfringe-
ment in order to prevent a single expert from taking inconsistent positions when discuss-
ing invalidity and noninfringement.  Indeed, it is not uncommon for a defendant’s legal
team to have dedicated invalidity and noninfringement teams.
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fringement has its own unique steps, including developing evidence
about the accused product or process, learning how it works, and
comparing its elements to the limitations of the asserted patent
claims.
If enough is at stake, then the added cost of developing two de-
fenses may be worth it.  But with patent litigation becoming more and
more expensive120 and many frequent defendants facing dozens or
hundreds of patent lawsuits,121 it is not surprising that defendants
look to cut costs where they can.  This strategy can be risky because a
defendant losing a patent lawsuit may have to pay large damages or
even take its product off the market if the patent holder can obtain a
permanent injunction.122  But this risk is manageable because most
patent cases settle123 and because injunctions are more difficult to ob-
tain since the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.124
B. Asymmetries
If trade-offs between noninfringement and invalidity lead most
defendants to focus on just one of the two defenses, then the next
obvious question is whether one defense or the other has any system-
atic advantage.  This section discusses three asymmetries that can lead
120 The American Intellectual Property Law Association has long conducted a biennial
economic survey of its members.  The 1991 survey found that the median patent litigation,
through trial, would cost each side $396,000. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT
OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 1991, at 29 (1991).  In 2001, the survey broke out the average by the
amount at stake in the case; with less than $1 million at stake, the median reported cost was
$499,000, while if more than $25 million was at stake, the median reported cost was
$2,992,000. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001, at
84–85 (2001).  In 2011, those numbers had grown to $650,000 (less than $1 million at
stake) and $5 million (more than $25 million at stake). AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASS’N, supra note 117, at I-153 to I-154. R
121 This is especially common in the fields of computer hardware and software.  Ac-
cording to searches of the Lex Machina patent-litigation database, for example, as of De-
cember 30, 2012, Apple Inc. was a party in 121 open patent cases; Microsoft Corp. was a
party in 55 open cases; Google Corp. was a party in 86 open cases; various Sony companies
were parties in 94 open cases; and various Samsung companies were parties in 104 open
cases.
122 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (injunctions); id. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)
(damages).
123 See infra Part II.C.
124 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  Before eBay, a successful patent plaintiff was almost always
entitled to a permanent injunction; the Federal Circuit applied a “general rule that courts
will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circum-
stances.” Id. at 391 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  One study
found that after eBay was decided, the proportion of winning patent plaintiffs who ob-
tained an injunction dropped from 100% to 60%.  Benjamin N. Simler & Scott McClel-
land, A Model for Predicting Permanent Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange, 5 BLOOMBERG
LAW REPORTS—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
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defendants to prefer focusing on noninfringement: the elevated bur-
den of proof that applies to invalidity defenses; information and tim-
ing advantages enjoyed by plaintiffs arguing validity; and the
asymmetric outcomes of successful invalidity and noninfringement
defenses.
1. Invalidity’s Elevated Burden of Proof
The most basic asymmetry between litigating invalidity and non-
infringement is in their burdens of proof: invalidity must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, while infringement must be proved
only by a preponderance of the evidence.125  This difference arises
from 35 U.S.C. § 282(a), which requires that patents be “presumed
valid” and that a party asserting that a patent claim is invalid has the
burden of so proving.126  Accordingly, to prevail on a noninfringe-
ment defense, an accused infringer must only show that the patent
holder cannot win by a preponderance of the evidence, but to prevail
on an invalidity defense, it must show that the patent is invalid by clear
and convincing evidence, a substantially greater burden.
The standard justification for the elevated burden of proof is that
a patent grant represents an administrative decision of the United
States.  Since such decisions are made only after extensive examina-
tion by expert patent examiners, the story goes, they are likely to be
correct and are therefore entitled to some deference.127  This justifica-
tion has been criticized by scholars, judges, and the Federal Trade
Commission, who point out that patent examiners spend little time on
each patent, lack sufficient knowledge of the prior art, often have not
even seen all the relevant prior art, and do not benefit from an adver-
sarial presentation on the merits of a patent application.128  I share
125 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2240 (2011) (invalidity); Cen-
tricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (infringement).
126 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
127 See, e.g., Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2249 (noting the “rationale underlying the presump-
tion—that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claim” (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); HARMON,
HOMAN & MCMAHON, supra note 40, § 1.5(a); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 70, at 53–56. R
Other justifications have also been asserted. See, e.g., The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S.
275, 292 (1892) (observing that it was the patent holder “who first published this device;
put it upon record; made use of it for a practical purpose; and gave it to the public, by
which it was eagerly seized upon, and spread until there is scarcely a cattle-raising district
in the world in which it is not extensively employed,” and concluding on that basis that
“the doubts we entertain concerning the actual inventor of this device should be resolved
in favor of the patentee”), quoted in Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2249; Lichtman & Lemley, supra
note 70, at 56–57 (observing, with some skepticism, that the presumption of validity R
“reduces uncertainty and thereby increases a patent holder’s incentive to invest in the de-
velopment and commercialization of his patented technology”).
128 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Law, Business, and Economics Professors in
Support of Petitioner, Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290) (arguing against the
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:
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this skepticism, though a full discussion of the merits of invalidity’s
elevated burden of proof are beyond the scope of this Article.  In-
stead, the point is that it has the effect of making it harder to win on
invalidity defenses, which makes defendants more likely to rely on
noninfringement.129
2. Information and Timing Advantages
Information and timing advantages also make it harder for a de-
fendant to win on an invalidity defense.  Litigating invalidity and non-
infringement require different kinds of information.130  Invalidity is a
question about the asserted patent, so it depends on information
about that patent—its claims, specification, and prosecution history—
and information about the state of the world when the patent was
granted (to the extent the invalidity argument is based on prior art).
Noninfringement, on the other hand, is a question about the accused
product or process, so it depends on the features and workings of that
product or process.131
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 28 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (recommending that Congress change
the burden to a preponderance of the evidence); William Alsup, Memo to Congress: A District
Judge’s Proposal for Patent Reform; Revisiting the Clear and Convincing Standard and Calibrating
Deference to the Strength of the Examination, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1647, 1650–54 (2009)
(discussing problems with the elevated burden of proof for invalidity); B.D. Daniel, Height-
ened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 412
(2008) (arguing that the public has a “paramount interest” in ensuring that only valid
patents are granted and that this public interest suggests that the appropriate standard for
evaluating invalidity claims is preponderance of the evidence); Alan Devlin, Revisiting the
Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 323, 333–38 (2008) (arguing that challenges
the PTO faces—including limited information, increasing applicants, inadequate funding
and improper incentives—undermine the presumption of validity); Lichtman & Lemley,
supra note 70, at 59–61 (arguing that the elevated burden of proof for invalidity is illogical R
and departs from the pre–Federal Circuit case law).
129 See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 36, at 1147 n.295; Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 70, at R
51; Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on
Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 113 (2006) (suggesting that since the Federal Circuit
began enforcing a stronger presumption of validity in 1982, “infringement has become the
pivotal inquiry in patent cases”).  Experimental evidence confirms that the elevated bur-
den of proof can make a difference in jurors’ assessments of close cases. See David L.
Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from
Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 459–65 (2013).
130 Asymmetric information is a common assumption in game-theoretic models of liti-
gation, and it can have substantial effects on outcomes. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 252–60 (1994) (modeling sequential and unitary trials accom-
panied by information asymmetries); Kong-Pin Chen et al., Sequential Versus Unitary Trials
with Asymmetric Information, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 250–53 (1997) (same); Michael J.
Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 77, 78–84 (1989) (modeling
patent litigation and settlement licensing assuming, alternatively, common and private in-
formation about patent validity).
131 Both issues also depend on claim construction, which, like invalidity, depends on
information about the patent and about the state of the world when the patent was issued.
See supra Part I.A.3.
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Generally, patent plaintiffs and defendants will have different
levels of access to these different kinds of information.  And as a result
of this asymmetry, accused infringers will almost always have better
access to the information needed to litigate noninfringement, while
patent holders will often have better access to the information needed
to litigate invalidity.
Accused infringers will almost always have better access to infor-
mation needed to litigate noninfringement because they usually have
better access to information about their own accused products or
processes.  The defendant usually developed those products or
processes, manufactures or uses them, and knows how they work and
what their components and steps are.  The plaintiff may have some of
this information as well since publicly available products can be pur-
chased and analyzed, the results of processes can sometimes be ob-
tained, and their makers and users often advertise specifications,
schematics, and other details about the products’ ingredients and fea-
tures.  But often, facts that are critical to the noninfringement analysis
are expensive or impossible to obtain without inside information.
The extent of this information advantage can vary substantially by
industry, type of patent, and type of product or process.  Simple prod-
ucts and processes can lead to more symmetrical information since it
is easier to understand just by examining it how a simple product or
process works than to understand a complex one.  It is far easier, for
instance, to figure out how a tarp cover for a truck trailer works than
to reverse engineer the source code to the graphics algorithms in
Microsoft Windows.132  Regulated industries like food, pharmaceuti-
cals, and wireless telecommunications in which competitors must dis-
close much information to the government and the public—including
to patent holders—or more competitive industries in which competi-
tors advertise more information to the public can also lead to more
symmetrical knowledge between litigants since more information may
be available to patent holders.133  And even when the industry and
parties are the same, some types of patent claims lead to greater infor-
132 Cf. Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1365–68 (2008)
(holding invalid a patent on a tarp cover system for truck trailers, even after excluding all
expert testimony supporting the invalidity determination, because “no such testimony [is]
required” when “[t]he technology is simple and neither party claims that expert testimony
is required”).  (Disclosure: I was counsel to DeMonte Fabricating in the Federal Circuit
appeal.  The opinions stated in this Article are solely my own, and nothing in this Article is
based on confidential information learned in the course of that representation.)
133 See, e.g., AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370, 1378 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (observing that the plaintiff’s complaint had relied upon information contained
in the defendants’ FDA filings); see also Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Stan-
dards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 515–17 (2009) (arguing that the patent system is
poorly suited to promoting pharmaceutical innovation since the standards of patentability
and the social value of a new drug are poorly aligned).
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mation advantages.  In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, it is
easy to tell if a drug infringes a patent on a specific active compound,
since a chemist can just examine the accused drug and see if it uses
the same compound and since federal law typically requires that a ge-
neric drug contain the same active ingredient and be bioequivalent to
the original name-brand drug.134  Without taking discovery, though, it
may be impossible to tell if a drug was manufactured according to a
patented manufacturing process since the result may be identical even
if the compound was manufactured by a different process.135  But de-
spite these sources of potential variation, accused patent infringers
generally will have better access than patent holders to the sorts of
information and expertise needed to litigate infringement in most
cases.
For invalidity, similar information advantages can benefit patent
holders because patent holders sometimes (but not always) have bet-
ter access to information about the patent and the prior art.  If a pat-
ent holder filed the application that led to the asserted patent, then it
will have preexisting knowledge about the content of that application
and the prosecution of the patent.  This might include knowledge
about challenges to patentability raised by the patent examiner or
about prior art the patent was drafted to overcome.  If the patent
holder practices its patented technology or is an active competitor in
the technology field into which the patent falls, then it may also have
preexisting knowledge about the history of the field (i.e., about the
prior art).136  An accused infringer may not have the same historical
knowledge—especially if it is an upstart or if it competes in a different
market.
To take one example of a patent holder’s advantage in knowl-
edge of prior art, Honeywell has been a leading maker of thermostats
for more than a century.137  Honeywell has many patents covering its
products: a search of the PTO patent database finds 143 patents is-
sued since 1976 assigned to Honeywell with the word “thermostat” in
the title.138  In 2012, Honeywell sued Nest Labs, a startup that makes a
134 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(a)(ii) (2006) (active ingredients); id. § 355(j)(2)(a)(iv)
(bioequivalence); 21 C.F.R. § 320 (2012) (bioequivalence).
135 See, e.g., Julie E. Zink, Shifting the Burden: Proving Infringement and Damages in Patent
Cases Involving Inconsistent Manufacturing Techniques, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 81, 81
(2010) (discussing the role of discovery in patent-infringement cases that depend on the
specific manufacturing processes used).
136 I say “if” because patents can be bought and sold like any other property, and in
many cases the patent has been sold or transferred between its prosecution and a subse-
quent patent lawsuit.
137 Honeywell History, HONEYWELL, http://honeywell.com/About/Pages/our-history.
aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
138 The count includes nintey-one utility patents and fifty-two design patents. USPTO
PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE, http://patft.uspto.gov (follow “Advanced Search”
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high-tech “smart” thermostat, for patent infringement.139  Nest was
founded in 2010 by Tony Fadell, who had previously run Apple’s iPod
division;140 it is safe to say that Nest does not have the same sort of
institutional knowledge as Honeywell has of the thermostat prior
art.141
These information advantages are not absolute or necessarily dis-
positive of the choice between arguing invalidity and arguing nonin-
fringement.  Sometimes there will be no advantage: a patent holder
may have complete information (or at least adequate information)
about how an accused product or process works, and an accused in-
fringer may have as much or more information as the patent holder
about the prior art.  Other times the advantage can be overcome in
the litigation process through liberal fact discovery and disclosure
rules.  But even when the court mitigates the effect of any information
advantages through discovery and disclosure requirements, develop-
ing invalidity and noninfringement arguments is costly enough that
having an information advantage can be quite valuable at the margin.
Moreover, although the litigation process is designed to cure
some of these information advantages, timing effects reinforce these
information advantages by making it more difficult for discovery and
research to fill in the gaps between patent holders and accused in-
fringers.  Discovery forces defendants to disclose information about
how their products and processes work, while the availability of expert
witnesses helps defendants—or their counsel, in the case of informa-
tion subject to a protective order—understand this information.  And
the inherent delays in litigation give plaintiffs time to investigate prior
art and develop validity arguments, while rules that require each side
hyperlink; choose option for “1976 to present [full-text]” from “Select Years” menu; search
“ttl/thermostat and an/honeywell”; then click “search” button) (searched Aug. 30, 2013).
A broader search for patents assigned to Honeywell with the word “thermostat” anywhere
in the title, abstract, or specification finds 586 patents issued since 1976. USPTO PATENT
FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE, http://patft.uspto.gov (follow “Advanced Search” hyper-
link; choose option for “1976 to present [full-text]” from “Select Years” menu; search “(ttl/
thermostat or abst/thermostat or spec/thermostat) and an/honeywell”; then click “search”
button) (searched Aug. 30, 2013).
139 See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Nest Labs, Inc.,
No. 0:12-cv-00299-SRN-JSM (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2012).
140 Steve Lohr, Ex-Apple Leaders Push the Thermostat into the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2011, at B4.
141 IBM is another good example.  IBM has been the leading recipient of patents for
every year in the last two decades, receiving patents in a variety of fields relating to com-
puter software and hardware.  Press Release, Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., IBM Tops U.S. Patent
List for 20th Consecutive Year (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/press
release/40070.wss.  IBM was issued 6478 patents in 2012, for a total of almost 67,000 pat-
ents between 1993 and 2012. Id.  If IBM wanted to assert one of those patents, it would
have a wealth of internal knowledge about the history of the computer industry that would
help it find prior art and choose patents and claims that the court would be more likely to
uphold.
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to disclose invalidity contentions and prior art on which they expect to
rely help eliminate any gaps in plaintiffs’ and defendants’ knowledge
about invalidity.142
These timing advantages arise because a patent holder typically
can decide when to file a patent lawsuit.143  A patent holder can take
as much time as needed before filing a lawsuit to research the prior
art and position itself to defend against invalidity arguments.  Since
both a patent’s prosecution history and the prior art are generally
available to the public,144 a patent holder can effectively prepare
much of its invalidity case before receiving disclosures from an ac-
cused infringer.  The accused infringer, on the other hand, often has
much less time to develop an invalidity case while the lawsuit is pend-
ing—as little as forty-five days under local rules in two districts that
often hear patent cases.145  Conversely, although a patent holder can
spend as much time as it wants investigating the accused product or
process before filing suit, in many cases the information necessary to
develop infringement arguments is not available before the lawsuit is
filed and discovery is available.  Yet the accused infringer typically has
complete information about the accused product or process well
142 Information about prior art and a defendant’s invalidity contentions can be ob-
tained through normal discovery tools such as document requests (“Produce copies of all
prior art upon which you may rely to prove one or more of the asserted claims is invalid”)
and interrogatories (“State your complete basis for asserting that each asserted claim is
invalid, including the specific prior art upon which you rely”), but several district courts
have simplified the process by requiring that parties disclose certain contentions, typically
by specific, court-ordered deadlines. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. LOC. PAT. R. 3-1 to 3-4 (requiring
parties to disclose infringement and invalidity contentions by certain deadlines); E.D. TEX.
PAT. R. 3-1 to 3-4 (same); MODEL LOCAL PATENT RULES R. 3-1 to 3-5 (Intellectual Prop.
Owners Ass’n 2009).
143 A potential defendant can bring a claim for a declaratory judgment that a patent is
invalid, but only when there is a “substantial controversy” over the patent’s validity “of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v.
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Nick Walrath, Expanding Standing in Patent Declaratory Judgment Actions to Better Air Public
Policy Considerations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 501 (2013) (“If we accept the need for greater
consideration of public policy arguments in patent law, expanding standing in patent de-
claratory judgment actions offers a potentially attractive solution.”).  If a patent holder has
not taken “any affirmative action” asserting its patent rights, though, there is probably no
such controversy.  8 CHISUM, supra note 113, § 21.02[1][a][vi][C] (2012).  A patent holder R
can stay under the radar, then, by investigating and waiting until it is ready to bring a
claim.
144 Before the America Invents Act, it was in rare cases possible to rely on prior art that
was not available to the public.  The America Invents Act expressly eliminates several of
these corner cases, and may eliminate all of them. See Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior Art?,
PATENTLY-O (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/did-the-aia-elim
inate-secret-prior-art.html (probably yes).
145 See N.D. CAL. LOC. PAT. R. 3-3 (requiring a party arguing invalidity to disclose inva-
lidity contentions “45 days after service upon it of the ‘Disclosure of Asserted Claims and
Infringement Contentions’”); E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 3-3 (same).
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before the lawsuit is filed, along with the expertise needed to quickly
harness that knowledge.  Once it learns of a lawsuit, then, a defendant
can develop noninfringement arguments much more quickly than it
can develop invalidity arguments.
As with the underlying information advantages, these timing ad-
vantages do not necessarily apply in every case or even dictate which
defenses a defendant will use when they do apply.  In many cases,
both patent holders and accused infringers have plenty of time to de-
velop their arguments on invalidity and noninfringement.  This can
be because they anticipated litigation and prepared in advance, be-
cause they engaged in licensing negotiations before a lawsuit was filed
and so had access to the same sorts of information they would later
obtain in discovery, or because litigation proceeds slowly enough that
they have time to develop their arguments even with the constraints
litigation imposes.  And in many cases, one defense is so much more
viable than the other that the merits swamp any timing effects.146  But
just as information advantages can have effects at the margin, timing
effects that magnify or reinforce these advantages can likewise affect
the defenses upon which accused infringers rely.
3. Asymmetric Outcomes
Successful invalidity and noninfringement defenses also lead to
different outcomes, which create post-judgment asymmetries.  Both
defenses, if successful, leave accused infringers free to continue to
produce, use, and sell the accused products or processes, but each
defense also has unique collateral consequences.  A successful invalid-
ity defense acts in rem on the patent claims that were found invalid:
generally, those claims are dead and cannot be enforced in any subse-
quent patent litigation against the same or different defendants.147
An invalidity judgment thus necessarily benefits anyone practicing the
invention claimed in the patent (because he or she would otherwise
be liable in a patent-infringement lawsuit) or practicing in the tech-
nology field to which the patent relates (because even if he or she
does not infringe the patent, there is nevertheless a risk that the pat-
ent holder will sue).  As Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein ex-
plain, this makes invalidity a “general” defense, one with
consequences far beyond the defendant who raises it.148  A successful
146 See infra Part II.D.
147 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324–26 (1971).
148 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 5 (manuscript at 2–3, 13) (describing three R
categories of defenses in intellectual-property cases: “general defenses,” which act to en-
tirely negate intellectual-property rights; “individualized defenses,” which benefit only the
specific defendants who raise them; and “class defenses,” which benefit specific classes of
defendants but leave intellectual-property rights in place to apply against other defendants
not within those classes).
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noninfringement defense, on the other hand, means only that the de-
fendant’s accused product or process does not satisfy every element of
the asserted claims; the patent remains in force, limiting both the de-
fendant’s later activities and those of its competitors.  Such a judg-
ment can benefit others if it results in claim interpretations that make
the patent less likely to be infringed.  But in general, the benefits of a
noninfringement judgment are local to the defendant in that case,
making noninfringement an “individualized” defense.149
As others have recognized, this means that a successful invalidity
defense is a public good.150  Any competitor can make use of the tech-
nology claimed in an invalid patent without infringing the patent, and
the use by one competitor cannot prevent other competitors from si-
multaneously using the technology.151  And just as participants in a
market economy tend to produce fewer public goods because they
cannot internalize all of their benefits, in the aggregate, defendants
choosing between defenses will make fewer invalidity arguments be-
cause the benefits will flow both to the defendants themselves and to
their competitors.  This has two distinct effects: all else being equal, a
defendant might prefer to win with a noninfringement defense than
149 See id.
150 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear?  Incentives to
Innovate After MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 1001 n.121 (2009) (“[Blonder-
Tongue] discourages suit because it puts the challenger at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to everyone else in the field of the invention: that party must pay the full litigation
cost of invalidating the patent while its competitors enjoy the outcome for free.  As a result,
there is an incentive to hold back, to wait and see whether someone else will do the hard
work of putting the invention into the public domain.”); Farrell & Merges, supra note 62, at R
952 (“[T]he Blonder-Tongue decision makes successful challenge a ‘public good’ among
multiple infringers.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 75, 88–90 (2005) (“Invalidating the patent is a public good that benefits consumers
of widgets, but not any one widget manufacturer or even widget manufacturers collec-
tively.”); Miller, supra note 88, at 677–95 (observing that “Blonder-Tongue changed patent R
invalidity judgments from private to public goods”); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 5 R
(manuscript at 4–5); Michael Risch, Patent Challenges and Royalty Inflation, 85 IND. L.J. 1003,
1022 (2010) (“If invalidation of bad patents is a public good, then one would expect fewer
challenges than are socially optimal, because the challenger faces all of the cost and risk
but only reaps some of the benefits.”); Thomas, supra note 88, at 334 (observing that R
Blonder-Tongue means that “a potential opponent [of a patent holder] cannot appropriate
the benefits of a successful charge of patent invalidity to itself,” and thus that “the benefits
of a successful charge of patent invalidity became nonexcludable”); Sumida, supra note 88, R
at 853–57 (modeling the error costs from sequential patent litigation under the Blonder-
Tongue rule); Thomas Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Defer-
ence, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1202 (2008) (observing that patent challengers’ “patent invalida-
tion efforts would not accrue solely to them but would also extend to any other potentially
infringing competitors”); infra notes 151, 153. R
151 In economics terms, an invalidity judgment is both nonexcludable and
nonrivalrous.  This does not necessarily mean, by the way, that competitors are entirely free
to use the technology claimed in the invalid patent.  It is often the case that multiple pat-
ents apply to a particular technology, and even if one patent has been invalidated, others
may prevent, or impose a cost upon, competitors. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 13, at 119. R
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with an invalidity defense152 and might prefer to settle than to win
with an invalidity defense.  In both cases, the preferred outcome
avoids conveying a gift to competitors.153
The comparative advantage from winning a noninfringement
judgment instead of an invalidity judgment can be quite substantial.
The pharmaceutical industry provides a particularly clear example.
Drugs can be protected by several kinds of patents, such as patents on
active ingredients, patents on formulations for combining active in-
gredients with inactive ingredients to form finished drugs, and patents
on processes by which drugs are made.  Under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, a company that develops a new drug must declare to the FDA a
list of every patent protecting the drug or its use.154  A competitor that
wants to sell a generic version of the drug cannot do so until those
patents expire unless it can show that the patents are invalid or not
infringed by the proposed generic drug.155  And a potential generic
competitor may be far better off proving noninfringement than inva-
lidity.  If it proves that the proposed generic version of the drug does
not infringe the patent (for instance, because it is made by a different
process or it uses a different formulation), it may become the only
generic competitor in the market.156  If it proves that the patent is
152 Of course, all else is often not equal; a defendant might consider an invalidity judg-
ment more valuable than a noninfringement judgment if, for example, it would better
insulate later products from a new infringement lawsuit or if it would lead a patent holder
to be more likely to settle on favorable terms.
153 The classic problem of public goods is that they will be produced less than is so-
cially optimal, not that they will be produced less than some competing good (here, nonin-
fringement judgments). See, e.g., William H. Oakland, Theory of Public Goods, in 2
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 485, 485 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
1987) (“Public goods are of particular relevance to public policy because they tend to be
inefficiently provided by private arrangements such as the market mechanism.”).  The so-
cially optimal output level for invalidity judgments is less clear than that of many public
goods, however, since although their consumption is nonrivalrous, invalidity judgments
may have externalities stemming from their effects on innovation incentives.  But the same
economic qualities that generally lead public goods to be underproduced also lead to the
narrower conclusion that invalidity judgments may be underproduced relative to nonin-
fringement judgments since the two lead to different outcomes (i.e., are consumed
differently).
154 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (governing the filing re-
quirements for new drugs).
155 See generally id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (governing the filing requirements for abbrevi-
ated new drug applications).  Technically, the potential generic-drug maker must only cer-
tify that the patent is expired (or will expire) or that it is invalid or not infringed by the
proposed generic drug.  That declaration acts as a technical act of patent infringement;
the patent holder then has forty-five days to file a patent lawsuit, automatically blocking
approval of the generic drug for thirty months or until the patent case is decided. See id.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
156 It is not as strange as it may seem to say that a proposed generic drug would not
infringe a (valid) patent on the name-brand drug, even for a patent that covers the drug or
its formulation, instead of a manufacturing method that could differ between competitors.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic competitor must prove that its proposed generic
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invalid, on the other hand, other generic makers become free to
enter.  As economic theory predicts, duopoly and competition give
dramatically different prices: an FDA study found that when a single
generic drug competes with the brand-name drug, the generic drug
costs 94% of what the brand-name drug costs, but when just two ge-
neric drugs compete with the brand-name drug, the ratio falls to
52%.157  And the ratio keeps falling as the number of generic compet-
itors increases: with more than five generic competitors, generic drugs
cost on average less than 30% as much as brand-name drugs.158  A
generic competitor that wins on noninfringement, then, may get sub-
stantially higher prices for its generic drug than it would if it had won
on invalidity.
C. What About Settlement?
Though it is not exactly a trade-off or asymmetry between invalid-
ity and noninfringement, the proportion of patent cases that settle is
another stumbling block to courts invalidating bad patents.  Very few
patent lawsuits make it to final judgment; most are dismissed along
the way, usually pursuant to settlements between the parties.  One
study found, for example, that 66% of patent cases in a sample ended
in settlements or probable settlements.159  In contrast, in the same
sample, only 13% of cases ended in summary judgments, judgments
after jury trials, judgments as a matter of law, or dismissals with
prejudice.160
drug is bioequivalent to the name-brand drug. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv); see also id.
§ 355(j)(8)(B) (defining bioequivalence).  But generic drugs can and do have differences
in their inactive ingredients, and those differences can cause the active ingredients to be
released and absorbed at different rates.  Those differences are normally small enough not
to matter, but for drugs with a narrow therapeutic index—a narrow window between the
amount of the drug necessary to be effective and the amount that would be toxic—they
can be significant.  See, e.g., Michelle Hottinger & Bryan A. Liang, Deficiencies of the FDA in
Evaluating Generic Formulations: Addressing Narrow Therapeutic Index Drugs, 38 AM. J.L. & MED.
667, 689 (2012) (“The current [bioequivalence] range accepted by the FDA may be inap-
propriate for [narrow therapeutic index] drugs.  The FDA employs a [bioequivalence]
range to accommodate nearly all drugs, which makes the range wide for [narrow therapeu-
tic index] drugs.  This ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is dangerous and costly for patients who
take [narrow therapeutic index] drugs.”); Lesley Alderman, A New Disquiet About Generic
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at B6 (reporting concerns that some generic drugs do not
work as well as their name-brand counterparts).
157 Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProducts
andTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2010).
158 Id.
159 Kesan & Ball, supra note 10, at 273–74 (finding that 3370 cases were settled or likely R
settled in a sample of 5071 cases for which outcomes were known).
160 Id. (finding 656 cases in those categories).  The remainder were voluntarily dis-
missed; dismissed without prejudice; dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, want of prosecution,
or arbitration; or decided by default judgments.  Some of these categories, of course, may
also reflect settlements.
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Settlements of patent lawsuits wreak havoc in ways they do not in
other areas of the law.  Patent cases are not unique, of course, in hav-
ing high settlement rates; the same is true for most civil litigation.161
Patent settlements have collateral consequences, however, that are ab-
sent in most other areas of the law since a patent decision affects more
than the litigants to the case.  Settlements allow patent holders to
avoid invalidity judgments and thus to continue to hold out the threat
of infringement litigation even with patents that are unlikely to survive
a judicial decision.162  Since an invalidity judgment would free others
to practice the patented invention, an outcome that cannot happen if
the case is settled, patent settlements represent more than just a com-
promise between plaintiff and defendant.  Instead, they transform an
infringement lawsuit into an option of sorts: since a plaintiff can al-
most always settle a case (even if it means accepting very low dam-
ages), a plaintiff can file a lawsuit, try to extract the upside of a
favorable judgment or substantial settlement, and avoid the most sig-
nificant downside if the case does not go well.163
Settlements do not completely immunize patent holders from the
effects of weak patents since the strength of a patent undoubtedly af-
fects the size of the payment a patent holder can obtain in settlement.
If defendants perceive a patent to be weak—if, for instance, they know
of specific prior art likely to invalidate the patent—then they will not
be willing to pay as much to settle a patent lawsuit; likewise, if a patent
holder perceives a patent to be weak, it will be more willing to accept a
small settlement to avoid a likely invalidity judgment.  Still, we should
remain skeptical of patent settlements for a few reasons.  First, the
information and timing advantages discussed above mean that de-
161 For example, one study found that around 60% of final terminations in federal
civil cases were due to settlement.  Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?  Settle-
ments, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil
Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 732 (2004) (reporting data from 2000).  Reliable
data in this area turns out to be hard to come by. See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our
Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Conse-
quences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571 (2004) (describ-
ing numerous difficulties in analyzing data on case outcomes).
162 See Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 16–17), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2252849.
163 Indeed, patent holders have even more power to pursue the upside of significant
damages while avoiding the downside of invalidity thanks to so-called Super Sack covenants
not to sue, which allow patent holders to defeat jurisdiction by unilaterally promising not
to enforce patent rights. See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d
1054, 1059–60 (Fed. Cir. 1995), abrograted in part by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007).  Since a patent holder can always grant such a covenant after a case
has been filed, Super Sack covenants increase patent holders’ ability to file lawsuits and
pursue damages while avoiding invalidity.  The Supreme Court recently endorsed such
covenants. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 732 (2013) (holding that a unilat-
eral grant of such a covenant not to sue after litigation is underway can render a case moot
and thus divest a federal court of jurisdiction).
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fendants will often lack information about the strengths and weak-
nesses of patents asserted against them.164  Even a weak patent, then,
can sometimes be used to obtain large settlements, or many settle-
ments, since many defendants may not know that the patent is
weak.165  And second, because patent litigation is so expensive, even
the nuisance value of settling a weak patent lawsuit to avoid litigation
costs can be in the millions of dollars.166  But weak patents and pat-
ents with opaque validity information are precisely the patents that we
should most want courts to invalidate since those are the patents most
likely to be used for rent seeking without contributing meaningfully to
the state of the art.
D. What About the Merits?
It may seem that all this is much ado about nothing, that patent
defendants will make the arguments that are most likely to win in any
particular case.  Even if defendants are forced to choose between inva-
lidity and noninfringement, that may not lead to distortions if defend-
ants just pursue whichever defense is stronger given the law and facts
applicable in a particular case.  If merits asymmetries swamp the asym-
metries discussed in this Article, then litigation may already produce
an optimal level of invalidity judgments.  This argument has some
force since the success rates of invalidity and noninfringement de-
fenses seem to be closely linked to changes in the underlying substan-
tive law.  Indeed, as Glynn Lunney has shown, these success rates
essentially flipped when the Federal Circuit was created: before 1982,
about 75% of successful defenses were based on invalidity or unen-
forceability, compared to about 25% based on noninfringement; after
1982, about 65% were based on noninfringement, compared to 35%
based on invalidity and unenforceability.167  This shift corresponded
to changes in the substantive law, as the Federal Circuit expanded the
scope of noninfringement defenses but contracted the scope of inva-
164 See supra Part II.B.2.
165 And because there are so many overlapping patents in most fields, potential de-
fendants often cannot practically investigate to avoid practicing patents.  See supra notes
12–13 and accompanying text. R
166 Under the standard model of litigation bargaining, the greater the litigation costs,
the more likely settlement is since litigation costs represent the surplus to be obtained by
foregoing litigation. See, e.g., William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 106 (1993) (observing “the well-known result . . . that a
trial is more likely (given mutual optimism) the smaller the cost of litigation, the greater
the degree of mutual optimism, and the greater the expected damages”).
167 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14–15 (2004); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian
T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After All: Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the
Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41, 72–75 (2012) (updating study after the Supreme
Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)).
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lidity defenses.168  It would not be terribly surprising, then, if defend-
ants switched their focus from invalidity to noninfringement in view of
these changes in the two defenses’ strengths.169
Though it is surely the case that differences in their merits will
weigh heavily on an accused infringer’s choice between defenses,
there are nevertheless at least three reasons to think that other factors
play an important role.
First, patent claims are ambiguous enough, or difficult enough to
interpret, that in many cases both defenses are plausible and efforts
put into one defense can substitute for efforts put into the other.170
In these cases, accused infringers can effectively decide which defense
will be more plausible.  Scholars have long lamented the difficulty and
uncertainty involved in construing patent claims, with the Federal Cir-
cuit reversing nearly half of the claim constructions it reviews.171  This
gives parties leeway to argue strategically for and to obtain their own
preferred claim constructions.172  And different claim constructions
will favor invalidity or noninfringement arguments.173  This effect can
be substantial: the difference between a broad claim construction and
a narrow one can be the difference between a strong invalidity de-
fense and a nonexistent one, and the inverse is equally true.  As a
result, then, of the indeterminacy of claim language, defendants have
a substantial ability not only to decide which defense to pursue but
often also to decide which defense will have merit or will be easiest
and cheapest to win.
This does not mean that every defendant is free to choose be-
tween invalidity and noninfringement; in many cases, it is surely cor-
rect to say that one defense is so much stronger than the other that
litigation and doctrinal asymmetries have little effect.  But neither is it
correct to say that there is always one clearly superior defense.  The
range of potential claim constructions is broad enough in many cases
that a patent defendant has significant room to maneuver.  Accord-
ingly, the trade-offs and asymmetries between invalidity and nonin-
fringement can have an effect on the margin in surprisingly many
cases.
168 Lunney, supra note 167, at 2. R
169 If courts are more attractive venues for noninfringement arguments, then defend-
ants can also choose to pursue invalidity arguments in other venues, such as reexamination
by the PTO. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. R
170 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 53, at 46–52. R
171 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 36, at 234–37, 259–60. R
172 Attorneys have significant agenda-setting power in litigation, and they can affect
not only the arguments that courts consider but also the likelihood that courts will reach
specific outcomes.  See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of
Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187, 188–89 (1995).
173 See supra Part II.A.1.
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Second, there is evidence that patent defendants care about the
effects of their judgments on the post-judgment marketplace.  Ge-
neric pharmaceuticals, which I described above,174 provide an obvious
example since the price difference between duopoly (one possible re-
sult of a noninfringement verdict) and competition (the likely result
of an invalidity verdict) is so substantial.  But we also see signs in other
industries.  One famous example comes in the case of the Dutch elec-
tronics company Philips N.V. and patent holder Gilbert Hyatt, who
held dozens of patents for electronic components.  Mr. Hyatt’s pat-
ents—including one patent on the basic concept of a microproces-
sor—were greeted with skepticism by the electronics industry when
they were first granted.175  Regardless, Mr. Hyatt filed patent lawsuits
against numerous electronics manufacturers, and in 1991 Mr. Hyatt
settled with Philips.  The Philips settlement had one striking feature:
Philips agreed to partner with Mr. Hyatt to license the rest of the in-
dustry, with Philips getting a cut of Mr. Hyatt’s future licensing
revenue.176
Philips was one of Mr. Hyatt’s early targets, and it had substantial
reason to think that many of Mr. Hyatt’s patents—including the
microprocessor patent—were invalid.  Other companies, like Intel
and Texas Instruments, had done pioneering work to develop the first
microprocessors well before the priority date claimed in Mr. Hyatt’s
patents.  Indeed, the PTO later invalidated Mr. Hyatt’s patent in an
interference proceeding, finding that Mr. Hyatt had not reduced his
invention to practice—a core patentability requirement—until years
after another inventor did so.177  Yet rather than rely on these invalid-
ity arguments, Philips licensed Mr. Hyatt’s patents and agreed to be-
come his partner.  Perhaps Philips just believed Mr. Hyatt’s patents
were valid or wanted to avoid the downside risk of a judgment of in-
fringement.178  But another explanation is that Philips wanted to
avoid conveying a gift to its competitors.  Indeed, by helping Mr. Hyatt
license his patents in return for part of the revenue, Philips imposed a
tax on the rest of the electronics industry—a tax that it estimated
could be in the range of $100 million.179
174 See supra text accompanying notes 154–58. R
175 Andrew Pollack, Inventor Finds Ally in Philips, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at D4.  As the
Times reported, the microprocessor “patent was awarded 20 years after Mr. Hyatt applied
for it, and he had never brought his idea to practice and was not considered to have played
any important role in the subsequent development of the electronics industry.” Id.
176 Id.
177 See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming the decision of
the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences).
178 See generally Farrell & Merges, supra note 62, at 948–60 (discussing various ways in R
which incentives skew outcomes in patent litigation).
179 Pollack, supra note 175 (quoting a Philips employee as saying that a total licensing R
revenue of $100 million “is quite possible” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The Philips-Hyatt joint-licensing scheme is not unique; litigants
settling patent disputes have devised several similar structures, includ-
ing cross-licensing agreements, patent pools, and other joint ven-
tures.180  What these structures all have in common is that they are all
means by which patent holders and accused infringers can share the
benefits of the patent monopoly.  But such deals only make sense if
both sides bring something to the table.  Patentees, of course, contrib-
ute their patent rights.  Although accused infringers do sometimes
make substantive contributions to such ventures—including their own
patents or other technical or business expertise—they can also con-
tribute by forgoing their opportunity to invalidate the patent holder’s
patents.181
The third reason to think that non-merits factors play an impor-
tant role in a defendant’s choice of defense is that even if a defendant
were to choose between defenses based solely on their merits, those
merits do not exist in a vacuum.  The relative strengths of invalidity
and noninfringement defenses are products not only of the facts in a
particular case but of the procedural and substantive rules that apply
in the case and the results of each defense.  Rules like the presump-
tion of validity and the requirement in many courts that the defen-
dant provide invalidity contentions relatively early in the litigation can
make it harder or easier to succeed on a defense, changing that de-
fense’s merits.  The outcome of a successful defense also affects its
strength, all else being equal, since parties will invest more to obtain a
more favorable outcome.  A defendant might prefer an invalidity judg-
ment, for example, because it would prevent the patent holder from
asserting the patent against future products, while a noninfringement
judgment applies only to the specific products litigated in the case.
Accordingly, it is impossible to separate the merits of a defense from
the pre-judgment rules and post-judgment outcomes of that defense.
180 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391,
392 (2003) (stating that these types of arrangements may all be viewd as settlements of
patent disputes).
181 A particularly naked form of such deals comes in pharmaceutical reverse-payment
settlements, in which a patent-holding drug company and a potential generic competitor
settle a patent case with (1) the potential competitor agreeing not to enter the market
until the patent expires and (2) the patent holder making a (frequently large) money
payment to the potential competitor.  Since a valid patent that covered the generic drug
would prevent the potential competitor from launching its drug until the patent expires,
the simplest explanation for the reverse payment is that it is paying the potential competi-
tor not to challenge the patent holder’s monopoly by arguing invalidity or noninfringe-
ment, or, equivalently, to delay its entry if the patent were found invalid or not infringed.
Such concerns led the Supreme Court to hold that reverse-payment settlements are subject
to antitrust scrutiny. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
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III
THREE REFORMS
This Part proposes three reforms that would help restore the bal-
ance between invalidity and noninfringement and make litigation a
better tool for invalidating bad patents.
Since this imbalance is a product of the trade-offs and asymme-
tries between invalidity and noninfringement, efforts to level the play-
ing field between invalidity and noninfringement should work to
eliminate or counteract one or more of these trade-offs and asymme-
tries.  Yet some of these trade-offs and asymmetries cannot easily be
changed, or should not be changed, because they exist for good rea-
sons.  The three proposals in this Part would make it easier or more
advantageous for defendants to argue invalidity and for courts to de-
cide invalidity claims, without producing significant adverse side
effects.
A. Eliminate the Elevated Burden of Proof for Invalidity
One useful reform would be to eliminate the elevated burden of
proof that applies to invalidity, which is perhaps the most striking doc-
trinal asymmetry between invalidity and noninfringement.  That bur-
den, which stems from the statutory presumption that a patent is valid
unless proved otherwise, makes it relatively more difficult to win an
invalidity defense than a noninfringement defense even if the two de-
fenses would otherwise have similar merits.182  Scholars and others
have long argued that this elevated burden of proof should be elimi-
nated, at least when the invalidity case rests on prior art that the pat-
ent examiner did not consider, since the policies underlying it seem
inconsistent with the modern reality of patent examination.183
This Article provides a different justification for eliminating the
elevated burden of proof for invalidity, one that does not depend on
patent examiners’ expertise or the quality of their review.  Instead,
eliminating the elevated burden of proof for invalidity would help
level the playing field for defendants choosing between noninfringe-
ment and invalidity defenses.  It would not completely eliminate the
difference between the two defenses since the burden of proving inva-
182 See supra Part II.B.1.
183 See supra note 128.  To be sure, this view is not unanimous; many patent holders R
and practitioners have argued that eliminating the elevated burden of proof for invalidity
would unduly weaken patent rights and the incentives to innovate. See generally Microsoft v.
i4i Limited Partnership, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
microsoft-v-i4i-limited-partnership/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (linking to numerous ami-
cus briefs in support of the elevated burden of proof for validity).  These arguments have
generally been rejected by legal scholars.  Notably, of the twenty-four amicus briefs filed in
Microsoft v. i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), in support of a elevated burden of proof for invalid-
ity, none were filed by legal scholars. See id.
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lidity would presumably still be on the defendant, while the burden of
proving infringement is on the patent holder.  But both issues would
be decided by a preponderance of the evidence, making it easier for a
defendant to focus on an invalidity defense.184
B. Permit Defendants to Bifurcate Patent Litigation
Another useful reform would be to enact rules giving defendants
the option to bifurcate patent cases, deferring infringement litigation
until after the court has reached a final decision on validity.  Such a
bifurcation rule would have three main effects.  First, it would elimi-
nate the trial-narrative trade-off.  Second, it would have indirect ef-
fects on other trade-offs and asymmetries, helping to counter the
trade-off stemming from resource constraints and the litigation-phase
asymmetries stemming from information and timing advantages.185
And third, it would make it more likely that courts would decide inva-
184 One could argue that if patent examiners were more reliable determiners of patent
validity, there would be less need for litigation to invalidate patents and so less need to
level the playing field by eliminating the elevated burden of proof.  Even if that were the
case, though, an invalid patent that made it through the examination system would be all
the more harmful since the public would assume that most or all patents are valid and the
invalid patent’s holder would be able to extract correspondingly greater rents.  And it is
unlikely patent examiners will ever be able to approach 100% accuracy in determining
validity since the task of judging whether complex technologies are new or not is necessa-
rily difficult.
185 Such a rule would standardize an area of practice that has previously been quite
heterogeneous, with judges exercising their case-management discretion in many different
ways.  Some authorities argue that because invalidity is an affirmative defense, it should
only be decided after the claim for relief—patent infringement—has been decided in a
way that makes it necessary to consider the defense.  Others respond that courts should
consider validity first because leaving validity undecided, as would happen if a court does
not find infringement, inevitably leaves some invalid patents in force. See generally 6
CHISUM, supra note 113, § 19.02[1] (discussing the opposing views on the order in which R
courts should decide issues of validity and infringement).  Both ordered sequences are
common, as is simultaneous litigation of both invalidity and noninfringement; the vener-
able Chisum on Patents hedges its bets, opining that “[w]hen both validity and infringement
are at issue, the better practice is to consider the question of validity first or concurrently.”
Id. § 19.02.
A bifurcation rule for patent cases in American courts would not be unique; Germany
has long decided validity and infringement in separate proceedings in separate courts.
Infringement claims are considered private-law matters and are decided in ordinary civil
courts.  Invalidity claims, however, are decided by a special patent court, the
Bundespatentgericht. See M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity
Issues Worldwide, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 334 (2006) (observing that the “dual character”
of the German patent court “reflects the simultaneously public and private conception of
patent validity in Germany”); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in Interna-
tional Patent Law, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 22 n.83), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2248398.
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lidity and less likely that parties would settle cases before such a deci-
sion had been made.186
The first effect, on trial strategy, is straightforward.  One reason
that patent litigants focus on a single defense is that it is hard to tell a
simple and coherent trial narrative that embraces both invalidity and
noninfringement.187  But if validity and infringement were decided in
separate proceedings with separate trials, there would be no need to
jettison one defense to maintain a coherent trial narrative.188
The second effect, on other trade-offs and asymmetries, is more
subtle.  There is an extensive economic literature on the choice be-
tween unitary trials (in which all issues are decided in one trial) and
sequential trials (in which a potentially dispositive issue is decided in a
first phase and other issues are decided in a later phase or phases).  It
is difficult to make firm predictions about the effects of each method,
though, because results are sensitive to the particular assumptions
chosen and because many of the assumptions chosen are unlikely to
hold in patent litigation.189  Still, we can make some preliminary ob-
servations about the effects on litigation costs and information and
timing advantages.
On litigation costs, a bifurcation rule could help counteract re-
source constraints by deferring the cost of infringement litigation to a
second litigation phase that may never occur.  Such a rule would not
completely eliminate the resource constraints that lead many litigants
to focus on just one defense; patent litigants would still have limited
litigation budgets, and litigating infringement and validity would still
have costs that are largely separate.  Indeed, such a rule might in-
crease the cost of some patent cases since the expenses that do apply
to both invalidity and noninfringement litigation would now be sepa-
rated across two phases.  But it would also put off many costs associ-
ated only with infringement litigation—including particularly
expensive costs like infringement experts and discovery about the de-
fendant’s product—until the second phase, if one ever becomes nec-
186 In this result, the bifurcation rule would introduce a new asymmetry between inva-
lidity and noninfringement, counteracting the existing trade-offs and asymmetries, rather
than reducing or eliminating those existing trade-offs and asymmetries.
187 See supra Part II.A.2.
188 It may seem odd to discuss trials of validity issues since patent validity is a question
of law.  Several forms of patent invalidity, however, turn on underlying factual questions,
such as the content and scope of the prior art.  Jury trials of invalidity issues are thus
relatively common. See, e.g., 2 CHISUM, supra note 113, § 5.04[3]. R
189 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 130, at 251–60; Chen et al., supra note 130, at 250–53; R
Landes, supra note 166, at 115–24; Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, Economics of, in 5 THE NEW R
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 162, 164 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume
eds., 2d ed. 2008); Jef P. De Mot, Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Are Sequential Trials
Really Better than Unitary Trials? (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-38, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2139787.
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essary.  This would allow defendants with limited litigation budgets to
focus on invalidity without spending simultaneously on a noninfringe-
ment case that could be much more expensive.  In the aggregate, a
bifurcation rule should reduce the average cost of a patent case so
long as the reduction in cost from cases in which patents are found
invalid (so that infringement litigation never becomes necessary) out-
weighs the diseconomies of bifurcation.190
A bifurcation rule likewise would not eliminate information and
timing advantages, but it could mitigate them.  Just as a bifurcation
rule would let litigants defer spending on noninfringement argu-
ments, it would allow them to focus their limited attention on devel-
oping the evidence needed for an invalidity defense.191  It would also
help if courts, or rule drafters, were careful to give the parties enough
time to develop their invalidity arguments.
The third effect of a bifurcation rule would be to make settle-
ments less likely before a court has decided invalidity.  This would
happen even if overall settlement numbers remained high.  This
might be the most significant effect of a bifurcation rule, and it fol-
lows from the effects on resource constraints and information and
timing advantages discussed above.  Settlement of a lawsuit is most
likely when litigation costs are high, when parties have identical infor-
mation about the likelihood of success, and when parties have the
same understandings about that likelihood.192  A bifurcation rule dis-
rupts each of these drivers of settlement, at least until after validity is
decided.  When the infringement phase of a case is deferred, ex-
pected litigation costs will be reduced, narrowing the range of settle-
ments both sides will find acceptable.  Likewise, when the
infringement phase is deferred, the parties will lack information dur-
ing the invalidity phase about the strength of the infringement case,
leading to greater optimism and asymmetrical expectations of success
190 See Landes, supra note 166, at 116–19.  In patent litigation, the cost reduction from R
bifurcation should outweigh the increased costs from diseconomies, for at least two rea-
sons.  First, many cases will be disposed of in the invalidity phase, suggesting that the gains
from bifurcation could be relatively large.  And second, since many of the costs of invalidity
and noninfringement do not overlap, the diseconomies could be relatively small.
191 If I am right that patent holders are often better equipped than accused infringers
to litigate invalidity issues, then deciding invalidity first is a counterintuitive remedy.  Yet if
information and timing advantages outweigh the benefits of bifurcation, then defendants
can simply decline to invoke the bifurcation option.  I expect, though, that the benefits of
being able to defer infringement issues will be large enough to make bifurcation worth-
while in most cases.
192 This is so because high litigation costs mean that the surplus to be gained from
settlement is greater, see supra note 166, and because asymmetric information and opti- R
mism make it harder for parties to agree on a settlement amount that improves on each
party’s expected outcome from litigation.  For general overviews, see Amy Farmer & Paul
Pecorino, Dispute Resolution, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note
189, at 500; Spier, supra note 189. R
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and thus to fewer settlements before invalidity is decided.  Since fewer
cases will be settled during the first phase, courts should decide inva-
lidity challenges in more cases and thus hold more patents invalid.193
While it is only a partial solution, the advantage to litigants from a
bifurcation rule should not be minimized.  Patent lawsuits are com-
plex affairs with many moving parts.  It is not unusual for a defense
team to have lawyers working on areas as diverse as understanding the
accused technology; analyzing the asserted patents and their prosecu-
tion histories; working with engineers from the defendant company;
working with invalidity and noninfringement experts; analyzing prior
art; analyzing documents from and deposing the inventor; analyzing
documents from and deposing witnesses from the plaintiff company;
and working on a whole set of remedy issues, including working with
experts and conducting fact discovery to make arguments about dam-
ages and a potential injunction.  Splitting a case into two parts would
cut the number of simultaneous moving parts by more than half since
infringement and remedy issues would be deferred, leading to a far
more manageable coordination problem.  This, in turn, would make
it much easier for defendants to do the research into the prior art and
the asserted patents’ prosecution histories necessary to present an in-
validity defense.
The main objection to a bifurcation rule is likely to be that it will
just make patent litigation slower and less efficient.  This objection has
some force since patent litigation is already a notoriously time-con-
suming process.194  It is possible, though, that a bifurcation rule would
reduce the average length and complexity of a patent case because
many cases would never need to reach the infringement phase.  In-
deed, several studies have found that almost half of patents litigated to
a final determination are ultimately invalidated by courts.195
193 Courts sometimes vacate rulings after a case settles, usually at the request of the
parties. E.g., Brice Dumais, Baker Botts LLP, Vacating a Judgment or Order as Part of Post-Trial
Settlement—Potentially Attractive, But Not Guaranteed to Work, 7 INTELL. PROP. REP. (July 2010),
available at http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/2010JulyIPReport.htm.  The Supreme
Court has disallowed the practice, at least when an appeals court is asked to vacate the
ruling under review. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29
(1994).  If my bifurcation proposal were implemented, courts would need to likewise re-
fuse such requests lest patent holders “buy out” invalidity findings in later settlement
agreements.
194 The median patent case takes more than thirty months to reach trial, and almost
20% of cases take more than four years to reach trial. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP,
2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 20–21 (2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/
us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
195 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 6, at 205–06 & n.52 (finding an invalidity rate of R
46% and summarizing prior studies). But see Meurer, supra note 130, at 89 (showing, in a R
formal model of patent settlement behavior, that the percentage of patents ultimately in-
validated by a court is unrelated to the probability that a patent is invalid before
settlement).
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C. Allow a Successful Patent Challenger to Recover from Other
Beneficiaries of an Invalidity Judgment
Finally, another useful reform would be to create a way for ac-
cused infringers who successfully challenge and invalidate patents in
litigation to recover some of the value they create by eliminating an
invalid patent.  I propose to do so by creating a new cause of action
for an accounting, which would permit a party that invalidates a pat-
ent to recover from industry competitors that otherwise would have
been susceptible to a claim for infringing that patent.  This would
help eliminate the asymmetry in outcomes between successful invalid-
ity and noninfringement defenses.
Several scholars have proposed similar bounty systems to over-
come the public-good nature of invalidity judgments and reward suc-
cessful challenges to patents’ validity.196  These bounty systems would
essentially pay for successful invalidity challenges, counteracting (but
not eliminating) the asymmetrical incentives to argue invalidity and
noninfringement.  While these bounty systems would help strengthen
an accused infringer’s incentive to rely on an invalidity defense in-
stead of noninfringement, they have two significant limitations.  First,
most of the proposals rely on the holder of the invalid patent to pay
the bounty.197  Many patent plaintiffs, however, are judgment-proof,
and this is especially true for the nonpracticing entities (or “patent
trolls”) that bring many patent-infringement claims.198  And second,
they would still leave a defendant’s competitors in a position to cap-
ture a windfall, benefiting from a patent being invalidated without
having to undertake the effort or risk of attempting to invalidate the
patent.  Although a large-enough bounty could make up for this short-
coming, simple fee shifting and similar bounties would not do the job.
196 See Kesan, supra note 78, at 787–97 (proposing a “one-way, pro-defendant, fee-shift- R
ing system” when patent claims are invalidated based on specific kinds of prior art (foot-
note omitted)); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 535–38 (2003) (proposing fee shifting to discourage
“opportunistic” patent litigation); Miller, supra note 88, at 704–30 (proposing that a pat- R
ent’s holder be required to pay a bounty to a successful challenger of that patent);
Thomas, supra note 88, at 340–47 (proposing that the PTO pay patent bounties to mem- R
bers of the public who provide information leading patent applications to be rejected);
Yelderman, supra note 78, at 45–48. R
197 John Thomas has proposed instead that the PTO pay bounties.  Thomas, supra
note 88, at 340–47.  Though this would avoid the problem of judgment-proof patent hold- R
ers, it would require potential bounty collectors to come forward far earlier, well before it
becomes clear that a patent poses a realistic litigation threat.  Miller, supra note 88, at 698 R
(arguing that “the patent examination stage is too early a time to award a bounty”).  It
would also likely pay bounties that are too small to change incentives meaningfully.
198 See, e.g., Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500:
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361
(2012) (finding that nearly 40% of patent cases in 2012 were filed by nonpracticing
entities).
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The proposed cause of action for an accounting would provide a
bounty that would be paid instead by the most direct beneficiaries of
an invalidity judgment: the businesses and individuals, typically com-
petitors of the successful patent challenger, who would otherwise be
vulnerable to a claim for infringing that patent.  These businesses and
individuals benefit directly from an invalidity judgment because they
can no longer be sued for infringing the patent or, if they have previ-
ously licensed the patent, would no longer have to pay royalties for
that patent.199  By transferring this benefit to the party that success-
fully challenged the patent, the accounting action would eliminate
the asymmetry in outcomes between successful invalidity and nonin-
fringement defenses while reducing the benefit to a defendant’s di-
rect competitors from an invalidity judgment.
Probably the closest analog to my proposed cause of action is a
proposal by Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein under which an in-
tellectual-property defendant raising a “class” or “general” defense
could implead other potential defendants to join the fight.200  For in-
stance, a defendant in a patent-infringement case that wants to argue
invalidity could implead competitors that might also be targets for the
same patent; the defendants could then share resources to fight the
patent.  Under the proposal, an impleaded defendant could decline
to join the litigation but would be bound in later litigation by an un-
successful outcome on the defense.  If the defense succeeded, the im-
pleaded defendant would have to reimburse the original defendant
for a share of the cost of the successful defense.201
Like my proposed accounting action, the Parchomovsky–Stein
proposal would help reduce the collective-action problem of litigating
invalidity.  It would do so by reducing the cost of an invalidity defense,
either by splitting the cost across multiple coordinating defendants or
by reimbursing a defendant for a successful defense.  It is not clear,
however, that just reducing the cost of litigating invalidity would go far
enough to make invalidity arguments attractive to litigants since other
trade-offs and asymmetries would still weigh against making invalidity
arguments.  The advantage of an accounting action is that it could
provide a litigant who invalidates a patent with a reward commensu-
199 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673–74 (1969) (holding that a patent license
agreement may not be enforced after the licensed patent has been held invalid); JAY
DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.02[1][a]
(2013); Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 150, at 991–1003 (analyzing incentives under the Lear R
rule); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Inno-
vate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677 (1986) (same).  As Michael Risch has pointed out, one side effect
of this rule is to inflate the royalties paid by patent licensees. See Risch, supra note 150, R
1003–04.
200 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 5 (manuscript at 29–30). R
201 Id. (manuscript at 31–33).
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rate to the value created by doing so, not just the litigation costs of
doing so.
One objection to my proposal is likely to be that it would just
create a system of secondary patent-infringement litigation, with a suc-
cessful defendant turning around and having to prove that its compet-
itors infringe a now-invalid patent.  This issue can be avoided,
however, by basing liability under the accounting action not on
whether one actually would have infringed the now-invalid patent but
on whether the patent holder could have stated a plausible claim for
patent infringement.  Such plausibility standards are common in
other areas of the law.202  And such a standard is a better match for
the real benefits of an invalidity judgment since an invalid patent im-
poses a tax not only on those who would infringe but on any party that
could plausibly be sued for patent infringement and so would have to
pay royalties or incur litigation costs.
Another objection to this proposal may be that it could give a
windfall to the first potential challenger when any of several competi-
tors could invalidate the patent.  This point has some force: while
there is little reason to think that the first defendants to be sued by a
patent holder are likely to be in the best position to invalidate the
patent, they may be the first with an opportunity to do so and thus to
collect under the accounting action.  This issue, though, can be
avoided by liberalizing the jurisdiction rules for declaratory-judgment
claims of patent invalidity.203  A standing rule for invalidity cases that
permitted any potential infringement defendant to challenge a pat-
ent’s validity would encourage competitors to compete to be the first
to invalidate the patent and to collect the resulting bounty, or to team
up with competitors to do so.  And such a rule would be consistent
with the reality that a patent imposes restrictions on behavior with or
without an imminent threat of suit.204
202 The Rule 11 standard for sanctionable litigation misconduct provides a good exam-
ple. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.  Another good example comes in cases deciding whether a
liability insurer is obligated to defend a policyholder who has been sued, in which the
question is typically not whether the policyholder is liable under one of the grounds cov-
ered by the policy but whether the policyholder has been sued for any claim that is poten-
tially covered by the policy. See Steven P. Inman & Robert Kinder, Securing Insurance
Coverage for Patent Infringement Lawsuits Under CGL Insurance Policies Could Save Millions, IN-
TELL. PROP. TODAY, Mar. 2012, at 13, 13–15.
203 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); Walrath, supra note
143; see generally David I. Levine & Charles E. Belle, Declaratory Relief After MedImmune, 14 R
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 491 (2010) (discussing the impact of MedImmune).
204 Alternatively or additionally, Parchomovsky and Stein’s proposal to permit the vol-
untary joinder of additional defendants in a patent-infringement suit would give potential
invalidators another way to contribute to the effort to invalidate a patent. See Parchomov-
sky & Stein, supra note 5 (manuscript at 29–30); see also Joseph Scott Miller, Joint Defense or R
Research Joint Venture?  Reassessing the Patent-Challenge-Bloc’s Antitrust Status, 2011 STAN. TECH.
L. REV., art. 5, at 2, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/miller-joint-defense.pdf (proposing
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Another objection to this proposal may be that it conflicts with
the public policy favoring settlement of private disputes.  It is un-
doubtedly true that an accounting action would give defendants more
to gain from refusing to settle, though it does not follow that settle-
ment will become less likely.  Instead, one possible outcome is that it
could change the relative bargaining positions of plaintiffs and de-
fendants, leading to fewer lawsuits or to settlements that are more
favorable to defendants accused of infringement.  But even if the ac-
counting action did make settlements less common, that might not be
a bad thing.  The public policy favoring settlements is motivated by
judicial economy, the need to reduce the risk of litigation, and the
feeling that privately crafted resolutions are more likely to respond to
private litigants’ real-world needs.205  But these reasons are less com-
pelling when there is a significant countervailing public interest—
such as the need to eliminate invalid patents—in the litigation.  In-
deed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the public
interest in free competition, unencumbered by invalid patent monop-
olies, can overcome traditional equitable considerations.206
A key question when recognizing a new cause of action is the
level of damages that would be awarded under that cause of action.
Here, the amount a successful patent invalidator should collect is dic-
tated by the goal of eliminating the asymmetry of outcomes between
successful invalidity and noninfringement defenses.  The upper
bound of the award, then, should be the amount competitors would
pay in damages to the patent holder—that is, the reasonable royalties
or lost profits that competitors would pay if found to infringe the pat-
ent.207  Such an award would transfer to the successful patent chal-
lenger the full benefit to competitors of invalidating the patent,
eliminating the windfall those competitors would obtain from an inva-
“strong-form joint defense agreements among multiple accused infringers” as another ap-
proach to overcome the public-good problem in challenges to patent validity).
205 See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 37–43 (1992) (discussing the public-interest benefits of settlement); Mar-
garet Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
35–41 (1996) (“Recognizing the benefits that flow from the private settlement of disputes,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the policy favoring settlement.”).
206 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (holding that estoppel does not
prevent a patent licensee from challenging the patent’s validity, in part because “the equi-
ties of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are balanced against the important
public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in
reality a part of the public domain”); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 235 (1892)
(similar).
207 See generally Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (summarizing the legal standards for a patent holder to recover lost prof-
its and a reasonable royalty, the two standard forms of patent damages).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 57  7-NOV-13 12:38
2013] PATENT INVALIDITY VERSUS NONINFRINGEMENT 127
lidity judgment.208  Such an award would be too much, however, be-
cause it would not account for the uncertainty in patent-infringement
litigation, especially if a successful patent challenger could collect
from plausible defendants without proving they would have infringed
the now-invalid patent.  Accordingly, the award should be adjusted by
the likelihood that the patent holder would have prevailed in a hypo-
thetical patent-infringement lawsuit.  Although it is hard to tell what
fraction of patent-infringement lawsuits would succeed if litigated to a
final judgment,209 a reasonable first approximation might be to award
one-third of the royalties the patent holder might otherwise collect.
This would be large enough to give potential challengers a significant
incentive to compete to invalidate patents and to dissuade them from
partnering with patent holders,210 yet small enough to avoid overcom-
pensating a challenger who invalidates a patent that may not have
been infringed by others.  And any surplus between the accounting-
action award and the actual damages that infringers would pay would
redound to consumers.
Although this proposal would help counteract the collective-ac-
tion problem stemming from the public-good nature of invalidity
judgments, it would not completely align a potential challenger’s in-
centive with society’s interest in eliminating bad patents.  As Joseph
Farrell and Robert Merges have recognized, the public-good problem
is not the only reason for incomplete incentives to challenge patents;
potentially as troublesome is the pass-through problem, under which
royalty costs are passed along to consumers.211  But reducing one
problem is better than reducing no problems, and combined, the pro-
posed reforms could significantly reduce the trade-offs and asymme-
tries that lead to courts invalidating too few patents.
CONCLUSION
Most patent scholars and lawyers agree that there are too many
bad patents in force, imposing a tax on creators of valuable goods and
services, and that the legal system needs effective mechanisms to elim-
inate those bad patents.  One classic mechanism for invalidating pat-
ents is infringement litigation.  Yet, as this Article has shown, the
patent system makes it harder than necessary for defendants to rely on
invalidity defenses and thus for district courts to invalidate bad pat-
ents.  Through a series of trade-offs and asymmetries between invalid-
208 It would provide the successful challenger a windfall, but that is the whole point—
to provide an incentive to challenge a patent’s validity.
209 See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 64 (discussing the difficulties in making infer- R
ences about legal disputes based on litigation outcomes).
210 See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text. R
211 Farrell & Merges, supra note 62, at 953–55. R
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ity and noninfringement, defendants are encouraged to focus their
efforts on just one defense and usually to make that defense nonin-
fringement.  Because of this, defendants challenge, and district courts
invalidate, fewer patents than they should; patent holders are able to
extract more rents using invalid patents; and more invalid patents re-
strict the behavior of the public.
Though there is no one perfect solution, a series of reforms
could significantly reduce the effect of these trade-offs and asymme-
tries.  Eliminating the elevated burden of proof for invalidity would
make it relatively easier for defendants to rely on invalidity defenses.
A bifurcation rule requiring district courts to decide validity before
infringement would make it easier for litigants to develop coherent
trial narratives for both validity and infringement issues while helping
them focus their resources on validity issues early in a case.  And a new
cause of action for an accounting would reduce the collective-action
problem posed by the public-good nature of an invalidity judgment.
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